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clarification and additional detail from the requesting agencies before the application was
submitted to the Home Secretary. We consider this to be an invaluable part of the approval
process, and the NSU demonstrated a commitment to ensuring that the information
submitted to the Secretary of State is clear and accurate.
16.5
Our 2018 inspection of the Home Office’s National Security Unit (NSU) focused on the
scrutiny they provide throughout the lifespan of interception operations. The Home
Secretary may impose conditions for review when approving any authorisation, for example
where it is judged that there may be an unusually high level of intrusion into the target’s
privacy. However, we noted a number of cases where the requirement for review was
not enforced and MI5 did not provide a relevant update at the designated time. We are
pleased to see that both the Home Office and MI5 have improved in this area in 2019;
the inspection found that all requested reviews were completed satisfactorily and in a
timely manner.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
16.6
The FCO is responsible for approving warrant applications from the Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), many of
which will relate to activities conducted overseas which are not subject to the double lock.
The introduction of the IPA required significant resources from the FCO to manage the new
authorisation regime, which included a number of domestic applications and applications
relating to bulk powers. This transition included an overhaul of the department’s central
records for warrants and authorisations which, as expected, assisted our oversight. Our
2019 inspection of authorisations at the FCO noted good evidence that the Foreign
Secretary and senior officials provided appropriate challenge to the requesting agency
in some difficult and complex cases. During this inspection, we scrutinised documented
correspondence between the FCO and requesting agency, which recorded examples of
the FCO challenging the scope and intrusiveness of proposed authorisations. We have no
concerns about the standard of scrutiny or challenge provided in those areas.
Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Office (NIO)
16.7
The Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and Scottish Government routinely consider interception
warrant applications from the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and Police Scotland
(PS) respectively. Both the NIO and the Scottish Government can receive interception
warrant applications from the NCA, HMRC and MI5. Additionally the NIO considers ISA and
other IPA warrant applications made by MI5 in relation to their Northern Ireland-based
operations. The WGDs of the Scottish Government and NIO are providing a robust guardian
and gatekeeper function for IPA applications in their respective areas. We saw a good level
of compliance with the Act and the Codes of Practice (CoP). There was clear evidence of
challenge and of early reviews being requested where appropriate and importantly that
these reviews were done and scrutinised.
16.8
In 2018 we criticised the collateral intrusion statements made by Police Scotland and
recommended that there should be greater consistency in some applications. We suggested
that this was an area the Scottish Government should focus on in the future. In 2019 we
facilitated a workshop in Glasgow with the Scottish Government and Police Scotland where
this area was addressed and in the subsequent inspection we saw a marked improvement
in how collateral intrusion is addressed.