Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
Findings
14.3
Whereas operational activity is a core Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) function, local
government personnel are far less frequent users of investigatory powers, particularly
covert tactics such as surveillance or CHIS. In our view, such infrequent use raises the risk
of staff becoming less skilled over time and we have found that it introduces a general fear
of using powers incorrectly. The growth of local authority use of the internet and social
media to engage with their communities brings the further risk that private information
made available on social media platforms will be reviewed or monitored by council
personnel without due consideration for privacy implications. The use of more conventional
surveillance tactics, such as the use of covert cameras and test purchase, continues to
decline and only a handful of local authorities used these powers in 2019.
14.4
Councils are increasingly favouring overt methods of investigation, for example using
mobile CCTV to deter fly tipping at local hot spots. We have found that the long-term
reduction in financial resources available to local government and increasing demands
placed upon them means that greater emphasis has been placed on collaborative working
arrangements, in particular with local police. In previous Annual Reports, we have
commented upon the chilling effect that the requirement to obtain a magistrate’s approval
in England, Wales and Northern Ireland has had upon the use of covert powers.44 However,
where applications are made, there is evidence that magistrates are actively ensuring that
such powers are being used appropriately by refusing applications where overt methods
would have been successful.
14.5
CD acquisition has been an area of significant potential change for local authorities through
the introduction of the ability to obtain events data. This is a relatively powerful new
capability and we would expect the value of this tactic to benefit councils over the coming
years. As described below, we have generally seen that these powers are being used
proportionately and that the central administration of application and acquisition processes
are working well.
14.6
We rarely encounter resistance to our inspection process, although it is not unusual for us
to need to make repeated requests for information in order to arrange physical or remote
inspections. Most councils welcome the opportunity to discuss covert investigatory powers
matters, even when they are not using the powers available to them on a regular basis.
We encourage all councils to provide introduction and refresher training to key personnel
such as Authorising Officers (AOs) and investigators on a regular basis and to undertake
awareness raising activity among wider council employees. As council staff become more
familiar with the available powers, and better understand how they may be used during
investigations, they become more confident to use them. Training is also the only effective
mechanism by which staff can be taught how to operate within the law.
Covert human intelligence sources (CHIS)
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) policy
14.7
Our most common recommendations to councils refer to their RIPA policies. As noted in
our 2018 report, we are still encountering RIPA policies that refer to the use of urgency
provisions which were removed from use by local government in England, Wales and
Northern Ireland by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. While this may seem a trivial
44 The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 does not apply in Scotland and CHIS and directed surveillance activity
is authorised under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000.
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