Annex 7: THE SNOWDEN ALLEGATIONS (7.7 above)
1.
In this annex, I summarise some of the main allegations that emerge from the
Snowden Documents unlawfully taken from the NSA in the United States and
subsequently published by a number of newspapers.1
2.
As emphasised at para 7.7 of the Report, this summary should not be taken as any
endorsement by me of the truthfulness or representative nature of the practices
alleged (all of which, save PRISM, are neither confirmed nor denied by the
Government), nor of the conduct of Edward Snowden.
Bulk interception allegations
PRISM
3.
The PRISM programme was said to involve the collection by the NSA of data from the
servers of nine US internet companies (Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk,
AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple - “the Prism Providers”). Types of data collected
included a range of digital information such as email, chat, videos, photos, stored data,
VOIP, video conferencing and online social networking details. An automated system
called PRINTAURA organised the data by category. Some providers had the
capability to provide real-time notification of an email event by a target, such as a login.2
UPSTREAM
4.
UPSTREAM data collection programmes such as BLARNEY, OAKSTAR, FAIRVIEW
and STORMBREW, were said to involve the collection by the NSA of communications
from the infrastructure which carries internet traffic, rather than from the servers of
internet companies. A slide referring to UPSTREAM programmes is said to describe
“the collection of communications from fiber cables and infrastructure as data flows
by”.3
TEMPORA
5.
1
2
3
4
This programme was said to involve the interception by GCHQ of digital traffic flowing
through the underwater fibre optic cables landing in the UK. It is described as
providing analysts access to “huge amounts of data”. “All web, email, social, chat,
EA, VPN, VOIP” is said to be “promote” from the cables; “high-volume, low value
traffic”, such as peer-to-peer downloads is then filtered out. A buffering technique
holds data in a “repository”; content for three days and metadata for up to 30 days “to
allow retrospective analysis and forwarding to other systems”. Search terms are
applied to the promoted data and any hits are entered into TEMPORA. Data is also
entered into TEMPORA based on “technology type or IP subnet”. In 2012, GCHQ
appeared to be managing to collect data from 46 cables in this way.4
References in this Annex are to on-line versions of the documents discussed.
https://www.eff.org/document/2013-06-06-wapo-prism.
https://www.eff.org/document/20140430-intercept-prism-olympics.
https://www.eff.org/document/2013-06-08-guard-prism.
https://www.eff.org/document/20140618-der-spiegel-gchq-report-technical-abilities-tempora.
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