CHAPTER 15: RECOMMENDATIONS
99.
ISIC should further be given the power, on its own initiative or at the suggestion of a
public authority or CSP, and subject to a duty not to disclose anything that would be
damaging to national security or prejudice ongoing operations, to:
(a)
inform a subject of an error on the part of a public authority or CSP; and
(b)
inform the subject of his right to lodge an application to the IPT;
in any case in which in the opinion of ISIC it is possible that the scale or nature of the
error might entitle the subject of the error to compensation.
Analogous activities
100.
To the extent that Recommendation 6 is adopted, the powers and functions set out
in Recommendations 84-99 above should apply in an equivalent manner to the
activities there referred to.
Reporting
101.
There should be a report at least once in every year dealing with all aspects of the
work of ISIC, and supplemented as may be feasible by more regular statistical
releases.
102.
As an expert, apolitical body with a strong judicial ethos, ISIC should also have the
power to carry out inquiries and produce reports into matters falling within its remit,
at the request of the Prime Minister or on its own initiative.
103.
The Prime Minister should have the power to redact ISIC’s annual report on narrowly
specified grounds (cf. RIPA s58(7)). The Prime Minister should be obliged to lay
ISIC’s annual report before Parliament within a certain number of days (or sitting
days) of receipt.
Organisation and working methods
Chief Commissioner
104.
The Chief Commissioner should be a person of unquestioned professional distinction
and independence, committed not only to leading the work of ISIC but to accounting
publicly and to Parliament for that work, and to building public awareness of ISIC and
its role. The Chief Judicial Commissioner should be eligible to serve also as Chief
Commissioner, but need not necessarily do so: some possibilities are illustrated in
the diagrams at Annexes 17 and 18 to this Report.
105.
The Chief Commissioner should be appointed by the Prime Minister. Consideration
should be given to allowing the ISC a voice in the appointment or confirmation of the
Chief Commissioner.
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