CHAPTER 15: RECOMMENDATIONS
(b)
equipment interference (or CNE) pursuant to ISA 1994 ss5 and 7, so far as it is
conducted for the purpose of obtaining electronic communications (cf. ISC
Report, Recommendations MM-PP);
(c)
interception pursuant to WTA 2006 ss48-49 (cf. ISC Report, Recommendations
XX-ZZ); and
(d)
the acquisition and use of bulk personal data (cf. ISC Report, Recommendation
X).
7.
The new law should repeal or prohibit the use of any other powers providing for
interference with communications.
But for the avoidance of doubt, no
recommendations are made in relation to the use of court orders to access stored
communications (e.g. PACE s9) or the searching of devices lawfully seized, save
that it is recommended that oversight should be extended to the former
(Recommendation 92(d) below).
8.
The new law should define as clearly as possible the powers and safeguards
governing:
(a)
the receipt of intercepted material and communications data from international
partners; and
(b)
the sharing of intercepted material and communications data with international
partners;
(Recommendations 76-78 below).
9.
10.
Existing and future intrusive capabilities within the scope of this Review that are used
or that it is proposed be used should be (cf. ISC Report, Recommendation BBB):
(a)
promptly avowed to the Secretary of State and to ISIC;
(b)
publicly avowed by the Secretary of State at the earliest opportunity consistent
with the demands of national security; and, in any event,
(c)
used only if provided for in statute and/or a Code of Practice in a manner that
is sufficiently accessible and foreseeable to give an adequate indication of the
circumstances in which, and the conditions on which, communications may be
accessed by public authorities.
Within the constraints imposed by national security, the current restrictions and
prohibitions relating to the disclosure of warrants and intercepted material (RIPA
ss15 and 19, Official Secrets Act 1989 s4) should be clarified and reviewed (cf. ISC
Report, Recommendation C) in order to ensure, in particular, that:
(a)
there is no legal obstacle to explaining the uses (and utility) of warrants to
Parliament, courts and public, and that
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