CHAPTER 13: PRINCIPLES
change. But as technology develops, bulk data analysis (notably by private
companies) becomes a standard feature of everyday life and digital investigation
techniques become more widespread, the trend may prove to be towards
convergence rather than the reverse.
13.43. There is also the issue of oversight, and its effect on culture. Where investigatory
powers are concerned, security and intelligence agencies, police and other public
authorities are all subject to the unitary audit and inspection regime of IOCCO.28 I
welcome this. The degree of an intrusion into privacy is not affected by whether that
intrusion is conducted by security and intelligence agencies or by police. Firm rules
and strong oversight are as necessary in one case as they are in the other. To subject
different public authorities to different sets of rules for essentially the same activities
could give rise to a dilution in regulatory expertise, different standards of oversight
(particularly if IOCCO were itself split down the middle), and ultimately – if a distinctive
“intelligence” culture were to develop where the use of routine investigatory powers is
concerned – different standards of conduct. It might even prompt a tendency to leave
the exercise of intrusive powers to whichever body was perceived to be less strictly
regulated. None of this would be welcome.
13.44. My fifth principle is, therefore, that there should be a single body of law, and a single
system of oversight, for equivalent investigatory activities conducted by different
public authorities.29
Recommendations – the objective
13.45. Applying the above principles in the light of the evidence submitted to the Review, a
single new investigatory powers law will have to provide exhaustively, clearly, in a
rights-compliant manner and with the maximum possible technological neutrality
for:
28
29
(a)
the types of measures permitted for the collection of data;
(b)
the range of public authorities entitled to collect it;
(c)
the objectives for which each type of collection measure can be used;
(d)
the categories of person which may be subject to each type of collection
measure;
(e)
the threshold required to justify the use of each type of collection measure;
(f)
the procedures for authorising each type of collection measure;
(g)
the duration for which each type of collection measure can be applied;
It is not echoed in relation to RIPA part II, whose surveillance powers are audited by the ISCommr (in
respect of the agencies) and the OSC (in respect of other public authorities). If my recommendations
are followed, this distinction will cease to exist.
This is reflected in my Recommendations 1, 6 and 7.
255