CHAPTER 12: CIVIL SOCIETY
12.78. While I set out these criticisms below, it is fair to recognise that the oversight bodies
themselves, whose views are not included in a separate Chapter, have engaged
constructively with me over the course of the Review. I have taken those positions,
and helpful discussions, into account in considering the force of the criticisms below.
Furthermore, the oversight mechanisms have achieved more public prominence in
the last year, and in particular after the main deadline for written submissions to the
Review. Some of the criticisms of oversight may have receded in the light of recent
detailed reports of the IOCC and ISC, and two IPT judgments finding against the
security and intelligence agencies.
Overarching considerations
12.79. A number of submissions to this Review emphasised the confusing array of individual
oversight mechanisms, with little clarity as to the demarcation between them.
Simplifying this oversight and ensuring that insofar as different bodies were involved
they worked as a cohesive unit was thus a key feature of a number of suggestions.96
Many highlighted the need for better coordination amongst all oversight bodies, and
particularly the ISC and the IPT, including the need to ensure access to confidential
annexes to the reports of other bodies. Moreover, a clear framework of responsibility,
by function or body, and a hierarchy of responsibility, would, it was suggested,
increase efficacy. Further, oversight bodies must have access to other systems: it
should be possible for the oversight body to easily pass on complaints to prosecutors
or Parliament.
12.80. Others have gone further to suggest the need for a single, full-time, independent
expert body (a “super-regulator”) with responsibility for all the different elements of
oversight.97 Were all surveillance powers to be brought together, this body would
therefore be responsible for all surveillance (including that which falls outside the
focus of this Review). Such an oversight body, in some submissions termed an
“Inspector General”, in others a general “Surveillance Commissioner”, would need to
be well resourced.
12.81. This was thought to have the significant benefit of simplifying oversight and assisting
with the consideration of proportionality. But there was concern particularly from the
ISCommr about diluting the personal responsibility of the current Commissioners, and
it was suggested that running a super-regulator could be too big a job for a retired
judge who wished to work only part-time.
12.82. In any event, in considering how to develop cohesive bodies, many emphasised the
need for oversight by technical specialists. This could either be done by providing
well-resourced assistance from technical and legal experts, or the increased use of
technical experts as part of the oversight mechanisms themselves (rather than in
simply supporting roles). A broader suggestion would encompass the use of “panels”
with officials from both a national security background and those who have expertise
in the protection of civil liberties from an external perspective. DEMOS suggested
96
97
See the submission of Peter Gill.
As set out in the submissions I received from the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Bingham
Centre for the Rule of Law, and students at UCL.
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