CHAPTER 12: CIVIL SOCIETY
ranking officer, whereas to listen in to one phone call would have required a
warrant from the Secretary of State.22
(c)
Moreover, there is overlap between different regimes, undermining the
safeguards attaching to some. For example, internal communications are
intercepted under s8(4) warrants, as are significant volumes of communications
data (discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 above).
12.22. The proliferation of other statutes providing for investigatory powers magnifies these
concerns. In particular:
(a)
How and when other regimes should trump the regime set out in RIPA or vice
versa is far from clear. As the scrutiny applied under different regimes may be
of differing levels, this raises concerns that a regime with lesser scrutiny may
be chosen to perform the same (or a very similar) function.
(b)
The extent of the array of different powers is unknown and often ungoverned
by supervisory mechanisms.
(c)
For many of these statutory powers, minimal safeguards appear on the face of
the legislation (e.g. TA s94).
(d)
The extent of the intrusion does not match up to the degree of scrutiny applied
to the decision. It is argued that similar protection should be given under RIPA
to that given to the search of a house, as the nature and extent of the
information involved is similar.
(e)
As pointed out in the submission I received from Roke Manor Research Ltd,
varying capabilities and investigatory techniques are beginning to converge
with the advent of technology.
12.23. In light of the above, there was overwhelming support in the submissions I received
from civil society for simplifying the statutory framework. The Bingham Centre for the
Rule of Law, which in its submission deals extensively with this point, urges:
“A single, comprehensive statutory framework should govern the use of intrusive
surveillance powers by public bodies. In particular, no public body should have
the power to access communications data save by way of this framework”.
For many, this view extends to all surveillance powers, including those currently set
out in or covered by in the Police Act 1997, ISA 1994, SSA 1989, and the different
intrusive techniques in RIPA Part II. While conceptions of how such a scheme would
operate vary, some have suggested a scheme analogous to that of PACE: a broad
statutory framework containing the key elements of what is considered lawful, under
which detailed Codes of Practice, more easily updated, can be set out.23 Professor
Peter Sommer in his submission focused on the intrusion that each power would
cause, suggesting that the greater the intrusion the greater the scrutiny and
22
23
See 8.18-8.19 above.
As explained in detail by Professor Peter Sommer.
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