CHAPTER 9: LAW ENFORCEMENT
crimes that are key indicators of police performance and public confidence”.12 Police
Scotland pointed out that it “directly affected the outcome ... establishing the
whereabouts of individuals and saving lives” in over half of all “threat to life” incidents
in Scotland in the latest three-month period.13
9.24.
12
13
14
Both in the context of this Review and in my capacity as Independent Reviewer of
Terrorism Legislation, I have acquired some familiarity with the resourcefulness and
knowhow that are deployed in these contexts. Communications data are frequently
used in the course of fast-moving operations, in which access will often be needed to
data in something close to real time. Some of this work is highly resource-intensive,
and depends on very quick decision-making by highly skilled experts:
(a)
An example, which I observed on a visit to the MPS’ SPoC was an unfolding
kidnap investigation in which requests for communications data were being
made every few minutes in an effort to detect the perpetrators’ movements and
contacts;
(b)
I was taken in detail through a five-week investigation, led by the CIU, following
a report that a child had gone missing. It progressed from being a high-risk
missing person investigation to kidnap, murder and ultimately a manhunt and
arrest. Five SPoCs were dedicated to the investigation, day and night,
throughout the five weeks. More than 30 UK service providers and several
foreign law enforcement agencies were engaged, and more than 900 RIPA
requests for communications data were generated in an investigation where
quick reactions and flexible procedures were at a premium.
(c)
The CPS has illustrated for me, by reference to 30 terrorism prosecutions, the
central role that digital policing has in the investigation and prosecution of
terrorism offences. The ability to extract evidence from social media and
messaging relating to a security-aware individual is exemplified by the recent
conviction of Imran Khawaja, a British fighter and propagandist for ISIL in
Syria.14
(d)
The NCA illustrated the importance of retained communications data to
establishing who was involved in a conspiracy, helping to ensure that leading
members are identified and convicted. Attique Sami was sentenced to 19 years
in March 2015 for conspiracy to supply and import Class A drugs, some 238kg
of heroin with a street value of £38m. Crucial to his conviction was the use of
retained communications data to identify that he had organised a meeting of
the co-conspirators because, although the meeting was under surveillance, his
presence there had not been identified.
Submission of PSNI to the Review, November 2014.
Evidence of DCC Iain Livingstone, April 2015.
Sentencing remarks of Mr Justice Jeremy Baker in R v Khawaja, Bhatti and Ali at Woolwich Crown
Court, 6 February 2015, accessible at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/khawaja-sentencing-remarks1.pdf. Further detailed evidence prepared for
me by the CPS was cleared for use too late for inclusion in this Report.
170