CHAPTER 7: PRACTICE

This is notwithstanding the fact that in the UK, intercepted material (controversially, in
the eyes of some) is not admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings.10
7.13.

None of this is surprising: but it should not be assumed that interception is of universal
utility. The chief terrorism investigator in the French judicial system said, of the
Kouachi brothers who perpetrated the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shootings: “The phone
tapping yielded nothing. ... No one talks on the phone anymore.”11 Senior officers at
Scotland Yard and the PSNI confirmed to me that there are hardened terrorists and
organised criminals so security-aware that listening to their communications brings
little reward.
Interception of known individuals

7.14.

The vast majority of RIPA warrants issued (2,795 in 2014)12 are made under RIPA
s8(1).
These are sometimes wrongly thought to deal only with internal
communications i.e. those whose sender and recipient are in the “British Islands”. In
fact a s8(1) warrant may apply to all the communications of those named in the
warrant. The use in principle of this form of interception, when targeted at individuals
about whom there are grounds sufficient to make out a case for a personalised
warrant, did not attract significant criticism from civil society groups or others who
spoke to me.13

7.15.

The question of “thematic warrants”, avowed by the ISC in February 2015 in the ISC
Privacy and Security Report, was not addressed by those submissions, although I am
aware that some may have concerns about such an interpretation of RIPA.

7.16.

There were 1,585 s8(1) warrants in place at the end of 2014, of which “the very
significant majority” related to a specific individual.14 However:
(a)

Where there is recognisable group of persons whose communications are to
be targeted, it is permitted to include them all in one warrant even if not every
member of the group can be identified in advance. These “thematic warrants”
were viewed warily by the ISC, which wished them to be used sparingly and to
be issued for a shorter duration than other warrants.15

(b)

It is also possible that a single target might be subject to more than one
interception warrant.

Accordingly, the number of warrants in place does not correspond to the number of
individuals or investigations concerned.

10

11
12
13
14
15

Intercept as Evidence, (Cm 8989), (December 2014). A report by a Committee of Privy Counsellors led
by Sir John Chilcott is the latest to recommend that arguments for change are not yet compelling. That
report lists a further seven since 1993 which have reached the same conclusion. See also 9.16-9.18.
Marc Trévidic, quoted in “Gaps in France’s surveillance are clear; solutions aren’t”, New York Times
website, 17 February 2015.
Statistics on interception warrants are taken from IOCC Report, (March 2015).
There was however criticism of the fact that warrants are issued by the Secretary of State rather than
an independent figure, and of the potentially wide definition of “national security”.
ISC Privacy and Security Report, para 42.
ISC Privacy and Security Report, Conclusion D. Cf. IOCC Report, (March 2015), 6.71-74.

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