7.
PRACTICE
Sources and scope
7.1.
This Chapter describes how the powers outlined in Chapter 6 are used.
7.2.
In relation to interception, it is based on written evidence provided by service providers
and from each of the nine public authorities that are empowered to intercept
communications. It is also based on oral evidence I received in the course of visits to
each of the security and intelligence agencies, the NCA, MPS and the PSNI. I have
also seen the highly classified material made available to the ISC for its parallel
enquiry into privacy and security,1 the confidential reporting to the Prime Minister by
the IOCC and the ISCommr and closed material given by the Government to the IPT
in the Liberty IPT Case.2
7.3.
As to communications data, this Chapter is based in addition on written evidence from
the police lead on communications data in England and Wales, Police Scotland, the
Department of Work and Pensions [DWP], the Local Government Association [LGA]
and a number of other bodies that are empowered to obtain communications data. I
received evidence from Royal Mail, whose powers to obtain such data has now been
removed and from the Magistrates’ Association. The Communications Data Strategy
Group, a joint group of law enforcement and UK CSPs, held a special extended
meeting for me at which I heard the views of CSPs and law enforcement
representatives. I also visited NAFN in Tameside, and spoke to Gloucestershire and
Nottinghamshire Police.
7.4.
The evidence I received from the public authorities that use interception and
communications data is mostly classified, since it sets out their operational needs and
methods, and cannot be published. But I have seen and been able to discuss with
security and intelligence agencies and other bodies some of their most sensitive
capabilities and believe that I have a fair understanding of how they use the powers
available to them.
7.5.
Other types of investigatory powers (e.g. directed and covert surveillance and use of
CHIS) fall outside the scope of this Review. But they are not so easy to separate out
in practice: as demonstrated by a recent GCHQ publication,3 information from a
variety of sources must often be pieced together to achieve a comprehensive picture.
The Snowden Documents
7.6.
1
2
3
Leaks of the Snowden Documents began to emerge in 2013 and continue to this day.
Many of the published documents and slides refer specifically to GCHQ. The
The results of which are set out in the ISC Privacy and Security Report.
Though for the past two years, there have been no confidential parts to the reports by the IOCC.
“How does an analyst catch a terrorist?”, an admirable (though inevitably limited) example of Agency
transparency, which can be found on the GCHQ website:
http://www.gchq.gov.uk/what_we_do/how_does_an_analyst_catch_a_terrorist/Pages/index.aspx.
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