CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
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example, should be directed towards vital societal systems for energy and water
supply, communication or monetary services.
The sixth point refers to the surveying of such conflicts between and
countries that may have consequences for international security. It may
regular acts of war between states but also internal or cross-border conflicts
different ethnic, religious or political groups. The surveying of the conflicts
examining their causes and consequences.
in other
concern
between
includes
The seventh point signifies that intelligence activities conducted against Swedish
interests can be surveyed through signals intelligence.
The eighth point provides the opportunity to conduct signals intelligence against
foreign powers and their representatives in order to survey their intentions or actions
that are of substantial importance to Swedish foreign, security or defence policy. Such
activities may relate only to those who represent a foreign power. Through the
condition “substantial importance” it is emphasised that it is not sufficient that the
phenomenon is of general interest but that the intelligence should have a direct impact
on Swedish actions or positions in various foreign, security or defence policy
matters. ...”
14. The FRA may collect electronic signals also in order to monitor
changes in the international signals environment, technical advances and
signals protection and to develop the technology needed for signals
intelligence (section 1(3)). This is regarded as “development activities” and,
according to the relevant preparatory works (prop. 2006/07:63, p. 72), they
do not generate any intelligence reports. However, the FRA may share
experiences gained on technological issues with other authorities.
Development activities usually do not focus on communications between
individuals, though information on individuals’ identities may be
intercepted.
15. Signals intelligence conducted on cables may only concern signals
crossing the Swedish border in cables owned by a communications service
provider (section 2). Communications between a sender and receiver within
Sweden may not be intercepted, regardless of whether the source is airborne
or cable-based. If such signals cannot be separated at the point of collection,
the recording of or notes about them shall be destroyed as soon as it
becomes clear that such signals have been collected (section 2a).
16. Interception of cable-based signals is automated and must only
concern signals that have been identified through the use of search terms.
Such terms are also used to identify signals over the airways, if the
procedure is automated. The search terms must be formulated in such a way
that the interference with personal integrity is limited as far as possible.
Terms directly relating to a specific natural person may only be used if this
is of exceptional importance for the intelligence activities (section 3).
17. After the signals have been intercepted they are processed, which
means that they are, for example, subjected to cryptanalysis or translation.
Then the information is analysed and reported to the authority that gave the
FRA the mission to collect the intelligence in question.