46
CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
159. The Court also finds that the Inspectorate’s activities are open to
public scrutiny. Beyond the audit provided by the National Audit Office, the
Inspectorate submits annual reports to the Government on its activities;
these reports are available to the public (see paragraph 38 above).
160. As regards personal data, further supervisory functions are
provided by the Data Protection Authority. The Authority has on request
access to personal data that is processed, documentation on the treatment of
personal data along with the security measures taken on such treatment and
access to the facilities connected to the processing of personal data. If the
Authority finds that personal data is or could be processed illegally, it shall
take remedial action through remarks to the FRA. The Authority may also
apply to an administrative court to have illegally processed personal data
destroyed (see paragraph 43 above). The Authority’s supervision led to
reports published in 2010 and 2016, in which some aspects of the FRA’s
activities were criticised. Issues of personal data and personal integrity,
however, were generally considered to have been dealt with in a satisfactory
manner (paragraphs 59-60).
161. Having regard to the above, the Court finds that the supervisory
elements provided by the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate and the Data
Protection Authority fulfill the requirements on supervision in general.
Moreover, the Parliamentary Ombudsmen and the Chancellor of Justice
have general supervisory responsibilities in regard to the FRA.
(viii) Notification of secret surveillance measures
(α) The parties’ submissions
162. The applicant submitted that the obligation on the FRA to notify
natural persons when search terms directly related to them had been used
was void of any practical meaning, since notifications had never been made
due to secrecy.
163. The Government confirmed that a notification had never been
given by the FRA for reasons of secrecy, but submitted that this was
compensated by the remedy according to which the Foreign Intelligence
Inspectorate could check at the request of an individual whether his or her
communication had been subject to signals intelligence.
(β) The Court’s assessment
164. The Court reiterates that it may not be feasible in practice to require
subsequent notification in all cases. The activity or danger against which a
particular series of surveillance measures is directed may continue for years,
even decades, after the suspension of those measures. Subsequent
notification to each individual affected by a suspended measure might well
jeopardise the long-term purpose that originally prompted the surveillance.
Furthermore, such notification might serve to reveal the working methods