44
CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
considered. Furthermore, the legislation only in very broad terms mentions
that the data may be communicated to “other states or international
organisations”; there is no provision requiring the recipient to protect the
data with the same or similar safeguards as those applicable under Swedish
law. Also the situation where data may be communicated – when necessary
for “international defence and security cooperation” – opens up for a rather
wide scope of discretion. In the Court’s view, the mentioned lack of
specification in the provisions regulating the communication of personal
data to other states and international organisations gives some cause for
concern with respect to the possible abuse of the rights of individuals. On
the whole, however, the Court considers that the supervisory elements
described below sufficiently counterbalance these regulatory shortcomings.
(vii) Supervision of the implementation of secret surveillance measures
(α) The parties’ submissions
151. The applicant, pointing to the findings of the National Audit Office,
submitted that the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate’s own documentation of
its supervisory work was scarce and that the Inspectorate lacked specified
goals.
152. The Government submitted that an assessment of the report of the
National Audit Office had been communicated to Parliament. The Office’s
overall conclusion was that the Inspectorate had been given the necessary
prerequisites to carry out its supervisory functions in an efficient and
effective manner. The FRA had taken the Inspectorate’s views seriously and
implemented measures accordingly. As to the Inspectorate’s goals, these
were clearly specified in the legislation.
(β) The Court’s assessment
153. The Court has found that, although it is in principle desirable to
entrust supervisory control to a judge, supervision by a non-judicial body
may be considered compatible with the Convention, provided that the
supervisory body is independent of the authorities carrying out the
surveillance, and is vested with sufficient powers and competence to
exercise an effective and continuous control (see Roman Zakharov, cited
above, § 275, with further reference).
154. As to the requirement of independence, the Court has taken into
account the manner of appointment and the legal status of the members of
the supervisory body. In particular, it has found sufficiently independent the
bodies composed of members of Parliament of both the majority and the
opposition, or of persons qualified to hold judicial office, appointed either
by Parliament or by the Prime Minister (see Roman Zakharov, cited above,
§ 278, with further references).