CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
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considers that what is essential for the protection of individuals’ rights in
the context of the regime under consideration is that the FRA’s signals
intelligence is subject to a system of prior authorisation whereby the FRA
must submit for independent examination an application for a permit to
conduct surveillance in respect of each intelligence collection mission. As
an additional safeguard against abuse and arbitrariness, the task of
examining whether the mission is compatible with applicable legislation and
whether the intelligence collection is proportional to the resultant
interference with personal integrity has been entrusted to a body whose
presiding members are or have been judges. Furthermore, the supervision of
the Foreign Intelligence Court is extensive as the FRA, in its applications,
must specify not only the mission request in question and the need for the
intelligence sought but also the signal carriers to which access is needed and
the search terms – or at least the categories of search terms – that will be
used (see paragraphs 18-20 above). The Court therefore considers that the
judicial supervision performed by the Foreign Intelligence Court is of
crucial importance in that it limits the FRA’s discretion by interpreting the
scope of mandating and performing signals intelligence.
140. As a final point under this heading, it should be noted that the FRA
itself may decide to grant a permit, if it is feared that the application of a
permit from the Foreign Intelligence Court might cause delay or other
inconveniences of essential importance for one of the specified purposes of
the signals intelligence. In this context the Court reiterates the need for
safeguards to ensure that such emergency measures are used sparingly and
only in justified cases (Roman Zakharov, cited above, § 266). As the
legislation states that such a decision must be followed by an immediate
notification to and a subsequent rapid review by the Foreign Intelligence
Court where the permit may be changed or revoked, the Court finds this
procedure acceptable (cf. Szabó and Vissy, cited above, § 81).
141. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the provisions and
procedures relating to the system of prior court authorisation, on the whole,
provide important guarantees against abuse.
(v) Procedures to be followed for storing, accessing, examining, using and
destroying the intercepted data
(α) The parties’ submissions
142. The applicant argued that the procedures in these aspects were
regulated in only very broad terms. For example, there was no general
obligation to destroy data.
143. The Government pointed out that the Foreign Intelligence
Inspectorate was responsible for scrutinising the treatment and destruction
of data in general and had a mandate to terminate surveillance and order the