CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
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the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the
legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate
protection against arbitrary interference (see Roman Zakharov, cited above,
§ 247, with further references).
120. The Signals Intelligence Act stipulates eight purposes for which
signals intelligence may be conducted (see paragraph 12 above). Although
some of these purposes are generally framed, they are further elaborated
upon in the preparatory works (paragraph 13), which is an essential source
of Swedish legislation. The Court finds that these eight purposes are
adequately indicated (cf. Roman Zakharov, cited above, §§ 246 and 248).
121. It is of further importance that signals intelligence conducted on
fibre optic cables may only concern communications crossing the Swedish
border in cables owned by a communications service provider.
Communications between a sender and a receiver in Sweden may not be
intercepted, regardless whether the source is airborne or cable-based.
122. It is true that the FRA may also intercept signals as part of its
development activities which, it appears, mainly concern the collection of
communications data. Such collection is made in order to monitor changes
in the international signals environment and to develop the FRA’s own
signals intelligence technology, and may lead to data not relevant for the
regular foreign intelligence being intercepted and read. Also, the search
terms used for interception of communications data – whether part of the
development activities or not – are less specific than those used for
interception of the content of a communication (see paragraph 62 above).
However, as noted by the Signals Intelligence Committee (paragraph 63),
the development activities are essential for the proper functioning of the
foreign intelligence and the information thereby obtained may be used in the
regular foreign intelligence only if such use is in conformity with the
purposes established by law and the applicable tasking directives.
Moreover, the provisions applicable to the regular foreign intelligence work
are also relevant to the development activities and to any interception of
communications data, including the requirement of a permit issued by the
Foreign Intelligence Court (paragraph 18). It is further of relevance in this
context that, in its 2010 and 2016 reports, the Data Protection Authority
found no evidence that personal data had been collected for other purposes
than those stipulated for the signals intelligence activities (paragraphs
59-60). In these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the scope of
application of the development activities is sufficiently demarcated.
123. As from 1 January 2013, the Security Police and the NOA have
been authorised to issue detailed tasking directives for signals intelligence.
While, as pointed out by the applicant, the tasks of these authorities include
crime prevention and investigation, section 4 of the Foreign Intelligence Act
clearly excludes the use of foreign intelligence to solve tasks in the area of
law enforcement or crime prevention (see paragraph 8 above).