CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
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paragraph 47). In particular, as expressly stated in the second sentence of Article
52(3) of the Charter, the first sentence of Article 52(3) does not preclude Union law
from providing protection that is more extensive then the [Convention]. It should be
added, finally, that Article 8 of the Charter concerns a fundamental right which is
distinct from that enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter and which has no equivalent in
the [Convention].
130. However, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the justification for
making a request for a preliminary ruling is not for advisory opinions to be delivered
on general or hypothetical questions, but rather that it is necessary for the effective
resolution of a dispute concerning EU law ... .
131. In this case, in view of the considerations set out, in particular, in paragraphs
128 and 129 of the present judgment, the question whether the protection conferred by
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter is wider than that guaranteed in Article 8 of the ECHR
is not such as to affect the interpretation of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of the
Charter, which is the matter in dispute in the proceedings in Case C-698/15.
132. Accordingly, it does not appear that an answer to the second question in Case
C-698/15 can provide any interpretation of points of EU law that is required for the
resolution, in the light of that law, of that dispute.
133. It follows that the second question in Case C-698/15 is inadmissible.”
The CJEU ruled as follows:
“1. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection
of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and
electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8
and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, for the purpose of
fighting crime, provides for general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and
location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic
communication.
2. Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in
the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation governing the protection
and security of traffic and location data and, in particular, access of the competent
national authorities to the retained data, where the objective pursued by that access, in
the context of fighting crime, is not restricted solely to fighting serious crime, where
access is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative
authority, and where there is no requirement that the data concerned should be
retained within the European Union.
3. The second question referred by the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil
Division) is inadmissible.”
4. The General Data Protection Regulation
81. On 25 May 2018 the General Data Protection Regulation
(Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,