matic number plate recognition measures are not solely carried out to prevent specific offences but to protect assemblies as such. Herein lies a protective purpose of
considerable weight.
(b) Upon reasonable interpretation of Art. 13(1) no. 4 BayPAG in accordance with
the principles of general security law, the carrying out of such measures is restricted
to sufficiently limited cases.
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The carrying out of automatic number plate recognition pursuant to Art. 33(2) second to fifth sentences, Art. 13(1) no. 4 BayPAG presupposes a police checkpoint and
is meant to support it. Art. 13(1) no. 4 BayPAG sets out the conditions for when a
police checkpoint may be set up. Yet this article, too, does not explicitly address the
details of setting up checkpoints. Rather, the wording of the article presupposes police checkpoints as the basis for identity checks. With this provision, the legislature
evidently intended to address the setting up of checkpoints and identity checks in a
single context.
132
Given that no further standards are set out, Art. 13(1) no. 4 BayPAG must be interpreted in accordance with the common principles of general security law. Thus, for
public security measures to be authorised, actual danger of imminent criminal acts –
which are to be prevented by the police checkpoint – must exist in the specific case
(cf. Art. 11(1) BayPAG). In light of the provision’s openness regarding its constituent
elements, this is the only constitutionally sound interpretation. It is not the Constitution that limits the setting up of police checkpoints to situations where a specific danger exists. To the contrary, the legislature may permit checkpoints below this threshold, for instance, for the protection of potentially dangerous major events or in the
context of specific police investigation strategies. The legislature must, however, provide for such cases by setting up sufficiently clear and limited requirements. To the
extent that the legislature does not set out further standards in this regard, one must
assume that the provision incorporates the requirement of a specific danger from
general security law, thereby giving it a constitutionally required limitation. Such an
interpretation does not deprive the provision of its content; rather, it is in line with the
general objective of Art. 13(1) BayPAG, whose main purpose is to authorise identity
checks independent of potential threats. Elsewhere, it also presupposes the objective
existence of a specific danger (cf. Art. 13(1) nos. 1 and 3 BayPAG).
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This interpretation also does not raise constitutional objections against the authorisation of number plate recognition measures at such checkpoints in respect of the
requirement of sufficiently specific grounds. Accordingly, number plate recognition is
only permitted if there is specific information on acts qualifying as serious criminal offences or considerable criminal offences or administrative offences in connection with
a specific assembly and, based on this, a police checkpoint has been set up. This
constitutes grounds that satisfy the requirements of proportionality.
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(c) The authorisation to carry out automatic number plate recognition at police
checkpoints set up to prevent the commission of criminal offences under assembly
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