217.
As a result, the Applicants have been left entirely in the dark about the
basis for the IPT’s conclusion that the bulk interception regime is
necessary and proportionate. This is an unsatisfactory outcome and
illustrative of the systemic deficiencies in the IPT’s oversight.
b.
Deliberate targeting of human rights organisations
218.
The Government submits that no inference that human rights NGOs are
deliberately targeted “can possibly be drawn from the IPT’s conclusions” in
relation to the unlawful handling/retention of Amnesty International and
the Legal Resources Centre’s email communications (Observations,
§4.103).
In view of the terse nature of the IPT’s third judgment, the
Applicants
are
unable
to
know
in
what
circumstances
their
communications were intercepted. Nevertheless, the communications of
legitimate and well-respected human rights organisations have been
initially intercepted, extracted, stored and analysed.
219.
There is no evidence that these interceptions were necessary or
proportionate. The Government has not sought to explain – even in barest
terms – why providing any further information would have jeopardised
national security or harmed the public interest. It is unclear, for example,
how either the public interest or national security could be imperilled by
revealing the statutory purpose(s) for which the initial interception, access
and/or selection of these communications were based.
220.
The IPT has also failed to explain what practical steps it had taken to
satisfy itself that the relevant initial interception, access and/or selection
of communications was lawful and proportionate. It simply limited itself to
the bald statement that Amnesty International’s communications had
been “lawfully and proportionately intercepted and accessed” and that the
interception of the Legal Resources Centre’s communications “was lawful
86