processing is concerned, not least when such data are used for police
purposes” (§32). It warned that the logic of the French government’s
arguments “would in practice be tantamount to justifying the storage of
information on the whole population of France, which would most
definitely be excessive and irrelevant”.
210.
As in Marper and MK, the Government claims the power to intercept in
bulk information relating to the lives of millions of individuals without
any individual reasonable suspicion that they have committed or are
committing a criminal offence or are engaged in an act amounting to a
specific threat to national security. This interception is “blanket and
indiscriminate” and is no less intrusive because it “undergo[es] automatic
processing” (in fact, the opposite is true – the availability of sophisticated
search and processing tools makes holding a large quantity of data more
intrusive because it can be rapidly analysed).
211.
Further, as to the individual necessity of bulk interception, one unique
feature of the UK interception regime is worth noting. Under s17 of RIPA,
evidence obtained by interception is not admissible
in criminal
proceedings. It is difficult to understand how evidence that will never be
put before a judge can be construed as strictly necessary for solving
serious crime.
3.
Conclusion on necessity
interception regime
212.
One of the
and
proportionality
of
the
bulk
Government’s primary rationales for justifying bulk
interception is that it is “critical both for the discovery of threats and for
the discovery of targets who may be responsible for threats” (Observations,
§1.29(1)). The Government thus admits that bulk interception is not aimed
at obtaining vital intelligence in any individual operation. Rather, it is
effectively a speculative fishing expedition, designed to check the
behaviour of an entire population. Such programmes are inherently
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