5.
The precautions to be taken when communicating intercepted
material to other parties
179.
Under s15(2) RIPA, the Secretary of State is simply required to ensure
that disclosure of s8(4) intercepted material “is limited to the minimum
that is necessary for the authorised purposes.” Those authorised purposes,
which are enumerated in s15(4), are broadly drawn and do not limit the
power to disseminate intercepted material to situations where there is a
reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or is likely to
commit a criminal offence or is a threat to national security. Moreover, the
s15(2) limitation does not apply to dissemination of intercepted material to
foreign authorities (s15(6)). The Independent Reviewer has noted, in this
respect, that there is “no statute or Code of Practice governing how
exchanges [to foreign authorities] should be authorised or take place”.109
180.
In Weber, by contrast, the transfer of intercepted personal data to other
authorities (e.g. public prosecutors, police etc.) under the G10 Act was only
permitted if (a) it served the protection of an important legal interest; and
(b) there was a “sufficient factual basis” for suspecting that criminal
offences had been committed. In this respect, it was necessary to establish
that “specific facts aroused suspicion that offences listed in s. 3(3) had been
committed” (§§40, 44). In addition, decisions to transmit data to other
authorities could only be taken by a staff member of the Federal
Intelligence Service who was qualified to hold judicial office (§§37, 128).
These requirements ensured that the person taking the decision “was
particularly well trained to verify whether the conditions for transmission
were met” (§§37, 128).
181.
The UK Supreme Court has recently observed that, “it can readily be
foreseen that the sharing and exchange of information between public
authorities are likely to give rise to disproportionate interference with
109
A Question of Trust, para 7.66.
70