public predicted, and that some have found disturbing and even unlawful.
Yet this was brought to light not by the commissions, committees and
courts of London, but by the unlawful activities of Edward Snowden.”72
The Independent Reviewer observed that a “[p]articularly striking” effect
of the Snowden revelations was “the realisation of the extent to which
communications were being intercepted in bulk”, raising “the potential (if
not properly regulated) for spying on a truly industrial scale”.73
112.
The RUSI Report concluded that “the present legal framework authorising
the interception of communications is unclear, has not kept pace with
developments in communications technology, and does not serve either the
government or members of the public satisfactorily”.74 It further
recommended that the framework undergo “a radical overhaul”, which
“must include an enhanced role for the judiciary”.75
113.
In February 2016, the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers
Bill published a report. The Committee referred to the reports by the ISC,
the Independent Reviewer and RUSI and observed that: “it is telling that
all three reviews found the current legislative framework provided by RIPA
and other legislation to be essentially unfit for purpose and in need of
replacement by a single piece of statute”.76
114.
On 17 May 2016, the CoE HR Commissioner published a “Memorandum
on surveillance and oversight mechanisms in the United Kingdom”, which
repeated a number of the key criticisms summarised above. It observed
that, in addition to RIPA, “a number of other Acts allow for the interception
of communications and provide for the acquisition of communications
data. Indeed the legal framework for this area spans some 65 Acts of
A Question of Trust, para 13.2.
A Question of Trust, para 2.31.
74 RUSI Report, p xi. Reply Annex No. 19.
75 RUSI Report, p xii.
76 Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, Report, para 30, HL Paper 93 – HC
651. Reply Annex No. 26.
72
73
47