Intelligence Services to conduct subsequent stages of the bulk
surveillance process, namely analysis and/or dissemination; and
(3) access to information initially intercepted, extracted, filtered, stored
and analysed by foreign intelligence agencies, permitting the UK
Intelligence Services access to the results of analysis.
34.
Article 8 is engaged by each of the above types of intelligence sharing. The
UK Intelligence Services’ ability to access, extract, filter, store, analyse,
and/or disseminate material that has been initially intercepted by a
foreign intelligence agency constitutes a discrete interference with the
right to privacy of the individuals whose communications are intercepted.
B.
UK bulk interception under the s8(4) Regime
1.
Overview
35.
The scope and nature of s 8(4) interception is unprecedented in the history
of the UK and, indeed, of any Contracting Party. Communications cables
have crossed the English Channel since 1850 and the Atlantic Ocean since
1858.11 Instant communications technology over long distances (e.g.
telegraphs and telecommunications) has existed since the foundation of
the Council of Europe. Yet no Contracting Party has ever put forward the
argument that it is necessary or justifiable to intercept – in principle – the
totality (or even a substantial portion) of communications transmitted
across such networks and to subject those private communications to
sophisticated automated processing, storage and analysis.
36.
The widespread bulk interception of fibre optic cables is likely to have a
particularly serious effect on privacy because of the nature of modern
communications technology. Until recently, a telephone call between two
Nigel Linge, The Trans-Atlantic Telegraph Cable 150th Anniversary Celebration 1858-2008,
University of Salford, available at www.cntr.salford.ac.uk/comms/transatlanticstory.php. Reply
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