suspects” within the UK (§50). The Court found, in that case, that “in the
constituent parts of the United Kingdom there is not always a uniform
approach to legislation” and that “[w]hether or not an individual can assert
a right derived from legislation may accordingly depend on the
geographical reach of the legislation at issue and the individual’s location
at the time” rather than “in terms of personal characteristics, such as
national origin” (§50). The Applicants contend that Magee is irrelevant to
the issues raised by the s8(4) Regime, which concerns a single piece of
legislation that accords disparate treatment to persons inside and outside
the UK.
268.
Furthermore, in Carson v United Kingdom, no. 42184/05, 16 March 2010,
the Court held the words “other status” in Article 14 “have been given a
wide meaning so as to include, in certain circumstances, a distinction
drawn on the basis of a place of residence.” (§70). Notably, in Carson, the
Court also distinguished Magee on the basis that it concerned “regional
differences of treatment, resulting from the application of different
legislation depending on the geographical location of an applicant” rather
than “the different application of the same…legislation to persons
depending on their residence and presence abroad.” (§70).
269.
As a result, the lack of additional safeguards applying to those not
resident in the British Islands is a relevant difference in treatment for the
purposes of article 14. The Government was therefore correct to make the
concession it did below, and there is no proper basis for taking a different
approach now.
B.
Justification
270.
The Government contends that the difference in treatment between those
for the time being in the British Islands and those who are not is justified
because the Government has greater, alternative, powers of investigation
103