ii)
A fundamental feature of many of the SIAs’ techniques of interrogating Bulk
Data is that they are non-targeted, i.e. not directed at specific targets.
Clarification in this regard is given on page 32 of the 2015 report by the
Intelligence & Security Committee of Parliament (“ISC”):
“It is essential that the Agencies can “discover” unknown
threats. This is not just about identifying individuals who are
responsible for threats, it is about finding those threats in the
first place.
Targeted techniques only work on “known”
threats: Bulk techniques (which themselves involve a degree
of filtering and targeting) are essential if the Agencies are to
discover those threats.”
10.
In relation to the third and fourth of Mr Eadie’s propositions there is however
acute dispute:
iii)
That the existing safeguards [found to be compliant (with the reservations set
out in paragraph 2 above) with the ECHR in our October Judgment] are
sufficient to prevent abuse in connection with the SIAs’ use of the capabilities
derived from BCD/BPD;
iv)
That if applied to the field of national security, the requirements specified by
the Grand Chamber in Watson (“the Watson Requirements”) would
effectively cripple the SIAs’ Bulk Data capabilities.
The Facts
11.
The Respondents have put in a good deal of evidence (including written
statements which refer to case studies), to which we shall refer further below.
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