needs of national security, as particularly exemplified in the passage from the
ISC Report set out in paragraph 9(ii) above.
30.
However, much more significantly, the Respondents point out that the Grand
Chamber in Watson did not deal with Article 4(2) of the TEU and the
consequence of the exclusion of (in particular) national security from the
ambit of the Treaty. The Respondents submit that the Member States have the
sole responsibility (Article 4(2)) for national security, that the Charter does not
apply (Article 6 of the TEU and Article 51 of the Charter), and that the case is
on all fours with the Court’s decision in Parliament v Council, in which the
supply of PNR data by the parties to the US Authorities for public security
purposes was “within a framework established by the public authorities that
relates to public security” and “does not fall within the scope of the Directive”
(paragraph 58-59 of the Judgment). The Respondents submit that the Charter
is of no relevance, and that the BCD regime should be tested only against the
requirements of the ECHR.
31.
We shall for the moment leave aside the asserted distinguishing features
referred to in paragraph 29 above, which become particularly significant in our
consideration of the application or relevance of the Watson Requirements,
though they must obviously be borne in mind when and if the Grand Chamber
comes to consider or reconsider in this national security context whether the
EPD applies at all. The Respondents accept that, even though all that the
providers do pursuant to a s.94 direction is supply data, that does involve them
in taking steps which would constitute processing of personal data within the
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