154)
I recognise of course that, simply by holding BCD that
relates to individuals who are not of intelligence
interest, and as with BPD, there is a degree of
interference with the privacy of such individuals.
However, the BCD in the database is, itself,
anonymous. Further, and as with all bulk capabilities,
whilst it is right to acknowledge that a significant
quantity of information can be collected, only a tiny
proportion of the data is ever examined.”
In paragraph 9.14(b) of the Anderson Report, the conclusion is recorded that
for MI5 the bulk acquisition power “has contributed significantly to the
disruption of terrorist operations and the saving of lives”.
16.
The evidence contained in the Anderson Report does not completely resolve
the question of proportionality, which issue has not yet been determined by
this Tribunal, but it does very clearly establish the purpose for which these
powers are deployed and how they are used. They are used not to access, still
less to examine, the personal data of all those contained within the dataset, but,
to the contrary, by a process of elimination, and with minimal intrusion, to
obtain access only to the data of persons whose activities may constitute a
threat to national security. That point was illustrated in the evidence, giving
an example of how in 2005, on the basis of sensitive but fragmentary
intelligence, it was possible for MI5, from an entire BPD dataset, to establish,
by applying a number of filters and matches so as to reduce a pool of 27,000
candidates, one person who was identified as a suspected potential Al-Qaeda
suicide bomber.
17.
Nothing in the evidence and materials we have seen contradicts what is set out
in paragraphs 11 to 16 above, and we accept it. The finding of this Tribunal is
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