30
WEBER AND SARAVIA v. GERMANY DECISION
data transmission was permitted and by the provision of supervisory
mechanisms against abuse.
(iv) Destruction of personal data pursuant to section 3(6) and (7) taken in
conjunction with section 7(4) of the G 10 Act
130. The Government took the view that the destruction of data was
necessary in a democratic society because it limited interference with the
secrecy of telecommunications to what was strictly required. Furthermore,
pursuant to the order of the Federal Constitutional Court, data which were
still needed for the purposes of court proceedings could not be destroyed
immediately.
131. The applicants argued that destruction of data obtained by means of
the interception of telecommunications likewise infringed their right to
respect for their private life. Leaving the responsibility for the retention and
destruction of files to the authorities involved entailed a great danger of
abuse. The persons concerned by strategic monitoring were entitled to be
informed about the destruction of personal data concerning them.
132. The Court notes in the first place that the impugned provisions, in
providing for the destruction of personal data as soon as they were no longer
needed to achieve their statutory purpose, and for the verification at regular,
fairly short intervals of whether the conditions for such destruction were
met, constituted an important element in reducing the effects of the
interference with the secrecy of telecommunications to an unavoidable
minimum. Moreover, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that data which
were still needed for the purposes of court proceedings could not be
destroyed immediately and that the supervisory powers of the independent
G 10 Commission covered the whole process of using data, including their
destruction. The impugned provisions consequently established further
safeguards against abuse of the State’s powers of surveillance.
(v) Failure to give notice of restrictions on the secrecy of telecommunications
pursuant to section 3(8) of the G 10 Act
133. In the Government’s view, the provisions on notification were
compatible with Article 8 of the Convention. As the purposes of strategic
monitoring in accordance with section 3(1) would often be undermined if
the persons concerned were subsequently informed about the measure, it
was justified in such cases not to give any notification.
134. In the applicant’s submission, the impugned section provided that
notification had to take place only if it did not endanger the aim pursued by
the restriction and the use of the data thus obtained. This exclusion of
notification was too broad and entitled the authorities concerned not to give
notification in order to avert dangers which were most unlikely to
materialise.