and l) to n)” — as well as from paragraph (2) of the same Section. However, we are barred
from contesting these last two passages by Section 30 (4) of the Constitutional Court Act.
Our argument is as follows.
I.
First and foremost, we need to substantiate our entitlement to lodge the present petition.
1. We lodge this constitutional complaint pursuant to Section 26 § (2) of the Constitutional
Court Act, because the violation we protest has occurred in consequence of the application
of an unconstitutional provision directly, without a court decision in the matter, and further
because there is no legal remedy available to address this violation.
1.1. As the provisions we contest affect us personally, effectively, and directly, our
complaint satisfies all requirements for “affected” or “concerned” status as set forth in
Order No. IV/2532/2012. AB of the Constitutional Court.
In a “concrete case,” the contested provisions enable a restriction of our fundamental rights
enshrined in Article VI of the Fundamental Law without any court participating in the
relevant decision, and without allowing for a court review of that decision. These
provisions require nothing more than a mere ministerial decision to authorize an agency to
collect covert intelligence, which amounts to the most severe intrusion into our privacy
imaginable. The staff of the counter-terrorism organization are free to search our homes,
take samples of and record by technical means anything they find, open our mail and
sealed packages addressed to us, accessing and recording the contents thereof, intercept
and record our electronic communications, access and record our data forwarded by means
of or stored on computers, as well as make use of the same.
Our involvement and concern in all of this is personal because, under these rules, we are
potential victims of the infringement of fundamental rights caused by the surveillance. As
we are going to explain in items II to VI of this complaint, the infringement of fundamental
rights is manifested by the absence of constitutional safeguards to protect us against the
surveillance, including the unavailability of legal remedy. The sheer possibility of
surveillance that is opened up by the contested provisions without any intervening
individual decision, the absence of any impediment by safeguards, and the covert nature of
the surveillance accomplish an infringement of our fundamental rights that is direct and
immediate. In this connection, the violation can be effective and direct not only when the
subject is or has been actually under surveillance. We do not know whether we are or have
been victimized by covert surveillance ordered by the minister as allowed by the
provisions contested herein. We simply have no way of knowing, if only because of the
inherent nature of covert surveillance, the point of which is to observe its target in secret.
In the event the Constitutional Court chose to confine effective and direct concern to
individuals actually targeted by surveillance, nobody would ever be able to lodge a