SZABÓ AND VISSY v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT
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to respect for private and family life and for correspondence (see Klass and
Others, cited above, § 41). Given the technological advances since the Klass
and Others case, the potential interferences with email, mobile phone and
Internet services as well as those of mass surveillance attract the Convention
protection of private life even more acutely (see Copland v. the United
Kingdom, no. 62617/00, § 41, ECHR 2007-I).
54. Any interference can only be justified under Article 8 § 2 if it is in
accordance with the law, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims to
which paragraph 2 of Article 8 refers and is necessary in a democratic
society in order to achieve any such aim. This provision, “since it provides
for an exception to a right guaranteed by the Convention, is to be narrowly
interpreted. Powers of secret surveillance of citizens, characterising as they
do the police state, are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as
strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions” (see Klass
and Others, cited above, § 42).
55. The Court finds that the aim of the interference in question is to
safeguard national security and/or to prevent disorder or crime in pursuance
of Article 8 § 2. This has not been in dispute between the parties. On the
other hand, it has to be ascertained whether the means provided under the
impugned legislation for the achievement of the above-mentioned aim
remain in all respects within the bounds of what is necessary in a
democratic society (see Klass and Others, cited above, § 46).
56. In its case-law on secret measures of surveillance, the Court has
developed the following minimum safeguards that should be set out in law
in order to avoid abuses of power: the nature of offences which may give
rise to an interception order; the definition of the categories of people liable
to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of telephone tapping;
the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data
obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other
parties; and the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or
destroyed (see Huvig v. France, 24 April 1990, § 34, Series A no. 176-B;
Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, §§ 56-58, ECHR 2000-11;
Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 30 July 1998, § 46, Reports 1998-V; Prado
Bugallo v. Spain, no. 58496/00, § 30, 18 February 2003; Weber and
Saravia, cited above, § 95; Association for European Integration, cited
above, § 76; and Roman Zakharov, cited above, § 231).
57. When balancing the interest of the respondent State in protecting its
national security through secret surveillance measures against the
seriousness of the interference with an applicant’s right to respect for his or
her private life, the national authorities enjoy a certain margin of
appreciation in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of
protecting national security. However, this margin is subject to European
supervision embracing both legislation and decisions applying it. In view of
the risk that a system of secret surveillance set up to protect national