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SZABÓ AND VISSY v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT
the effect of increasing the government’s control over policy at the expense of the
legislative power, and of insulating the former from criticism. This is exacerbated by
the fact that nowadays, there is a link between “external” and “internal” threats to the
State. Accordingly, security and intelligence information tends to form an indivisible
whole. ...
86. It is particularly important, as regards the limited scope of parliamentary and
judicial control, to note the special nature of security intelligence. The heart of a
security agency is its intelligence files. “Hard” data, purely factual information, is
insufficient for a security agency, or for that matter, any police organization. It also
needs to gather speculative intelligence in order to determine which people are, or are
probably or possibly, threatening national security. This information can be obtained
in different ways. A large proportion of non-open source internal security information
comes from informants. Like factual information, such “soft intelligence” can, and
must if the agency is to do its job properly, be collated to produce a personality profile
of a suspect or an analysis of a suspected activity. ...
VII. Internal and Governmental Controls as part of overall accountability systems
130. Internal control of security services is the primary guarantee against abuses of
power, when the staff working in the agencies are committed to the democratic values
of the State and to respecting human rights. External controls are essentially to
buttress the internal controls and periodically ensure these are working properly.
131. Internal controls mean in the first place that the senior management of the
agency must exercise efficient control in practice over the lower ranks of the agency.
134. Just as strong internal controls are a precondition for effective executive
control over the security agency, a strong executive control over the security agency is
a precondition for adequate parliamentary accountability, given that access by
parliament to intelligence usually depends on the executive. The same is less true for
expert review/authorization systems, to the extent that these have their own access to
officials and intelligence material ...
137. In order to provide for impartial verification and assurance for the government
that secret agencies are acting according to its policies, effectively and with propriety,
a number of countries have devised offices such as Inspectors-General, judicial
commissioners or auditors to check on the activities of the security sector and with
statutory powers of access to information and staff.
VIII. Parliamentary accountability
150. There are several reasons why parliamentarians should be involved in the
oversight of security agencies. Firstly, the ultimate authority and legitimacy of
security agencies is derived from legislative approval of their powers, operations and
expenditure. Secondly, there is a risk that the agencies may serve narrow political or
sectional interests, rather than the State as a whole and protecting the constitutional
order, if democratic scrutiny does not extend to them. A stable, politically bi-partisan
approach to security may be ensured therefore by proper control, to the benefit of the
State and the agencies themselves.
153. From a comparative international perspective, the most frequent arrangement
is for parliament to establish a single oversight body for all the major security and
intelligence agencies, rather than having multiple oversight bodies for specific
agencies.