9041, p. 22), clearly fail to meet this requirement. In particular, a statutory restriction
of the purposes cannot be replaced by the Mission Statement of the Federal Government, which is solely based on political considerations (cf. in this respect United
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, letter of the Special Rapporteurs of 29 August 2016, OL DEU 2/2016, p. 5).
Consequently, surveillance is not structured along the lines of formal determinations
of precisely delimited surveillance measures, which must adhere to the principle of
proportionality and must, in a verifiable manner, inform the selection of the transmission routes to be intercepted and of the search terms to be used as well as further
data processing and use (see para. 178 et seq. above; […]). Moreover, statutory requirements regarding the use of search terms targeting specific individuals (see para.
185 et seq. above) and confidentiality protection of relationships of trust (see para.
193 et seq. above; […]) are lacking. § 11 BNDG affords insufficient protection of the
core of private life (see para. 203 et seq. above).
306
Nor does the law sufficiently determine how the data obtained by means of strategic
foreign surveillance may be analysed (see para. 192 above). As a merely generalised
provision on data processing by the Federal Intelligence Service, § 19 BNDG does
not satisfy the requirements in this regard. The provision is disproportionate given
that it is unspecific and merely refers, in a broad and general manner, to §§ 10 and
11 BVerfSchG as the basis for processing, altering and using data collected pursuant
to §§ 6 and 7 BNDG.
307
cc) Insofar as § 6 BNDG is meant to also provide a basis for collecting other personal data of German citizens, German legal entities or persons within Germany to
which Art. 10 GG does not apply (cf. BTDrucks 18/9041, p. 24), the provision lacks
the required legal clarity (see para. 137 et seq. above). The provision does not even
make it clear that it is to serve as a basis for using data not protected by the privacy
of telecommunications; it also fails to set out which data is to be collected for what
use as well as on what basis and with regard to which fundamental rights the legislator considers this to be justified.
308
b) Secondly, § 7 BNDG, which governs the further processing of data obtained from
other states by means of foreign surveillance as well as certain limits to such data
collection, is also not compatible with Art. 10(1) GG. The provision is based on the
incorrect assumption that a statutory basis authorising such data collection is not necessary and that such data can be collected on the basis of § 1(2) BNDG alone, which
merely lays down the Federal Intelligence Service’s tasks. Yet such data collection,
too, is impermissible without a sufficient statutory authorisation (see paras. 87 et seq.
and 120 above). § 7 BNDG is unconstitutional in itself given that it implies that data
collection is permissible, only restricts it in some cases and otherwise allows for further processing of data without any restrictions. As a separate (implicit) authorisation
to collect data, it does not satisfy the constitutional requirements applicable to such a
statutory basis set out above. Yet as shown above, the legislator did not intend § 7
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