of confidentiality (cf. BVerfGE 129, 208 <258 et seq.>; 141, 220 <318 and 319
para. 255 et seq.>). The legislator will have to examine whether and to what extent
it must differentiate between different kinds of relationships of trust (cf. § 160a StPO;
BVerfGE 129, 208 <259 and 260>). In any case, ex ante oversight resembling judicial review must in principle ensure that such relationships are protected.
If it only becomes apparent during analysis that data concerning relationships of
trust meriting special confidentiality protection has been intercepted, it must be assessed whether the relevant requirements are met and, if that is the case, it must
then be determined in a balancing of interests whether the respective communications may be analysed and used ([…]). In this case, too, it is decisive whether the
measures are expected to yield intelligence on serious and fairly specific dangers
(sich konkret abzeichnende Gefahren) and whether the public interest in obtaining
this intelligence takes precedence over the protection of confidentiality when balancing these interests against one another in the individual case. Such a decision must
be subject to oversight resembling judicial review.
195
bb) For protecting professional groups and their activities abroad in the context of
foreign surveillance, the legislator can take into account the different conditions under
which the press or lawyers operate in other countries. Accordingly, it can limit protection to persons or situations that actually merit protection, which means that their activities are characterised by freedom and independence that justify the special fundamental rights protection afforded such institutions ([…]). What is decisive in this
respect are the value decisions deriving from the fundamental rights of the Basic Law,
which are integrated into international human rights guarantees (cf. Art. 1(2) GG).
Uncertainties must be addressed on the basis of informed assessments.
196
cc) It is primarily for the legislator to assess whether and to what extent other relationships of trust require protection.
197
dd) Insofar as surveillance measures are exclusively aimed at providing political intelligence to the Federal Government, are not linked to any aim of early detection of
dangers and the sharing of intelligence with other bodies is ruled out in principle (see
para. 177 above), the legislator can refrain from protecting relationships of trust
where necessary.
198
i) Art. 10(1) GG in conjunction with Art. 1(1) GG gives rise to further requirements
for the protection of the core of private life.
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aa) The protection of the core of private life guarantees the individual a domain of
highly personal life and ensures an inviolable core of human dignity that is beyond
the reach of the state and provides fundamental rights protection against surveillance. Even exceptionally significant interests of the general public cannot justify an
interference with this domain of private life that is absolutely protected (cf. BVerfGE
109, 279 <313>; 141, 220 <276 para. 120>; established case-law). This also applies
to intelligence services (cf. BVerfGE 120, 274 <335 et seq.>) and to surveillance
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