bb) As a basis for systematically structuring the surveillance process, the legislator
must set out the reasons for which strategic surveillance measures may target specific individuals. For instance, it can provide for the surveillance of individuals who
might create a danger, act as messengers or as other informants. In doing so, it could
draw up rules according to which the targeted surveillance of persons who are not
involved in any unlawful conduct is only permissible once all other options have been
exhausted. However, in this respect, too, objective thresholds for the use of powers
are not required; it is sufficient that the specific purposes of targeted surveillance of
individuals are determined, which, again, means that it is sufficient that measures are
guided by the purposes pursued.
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The legislator must create a separate mechanism for the protection of individuals
that could be of direct interest to the Intelligence Service, either because they might
create a danger or because of follow-up measures to be taken against them. Surveillance measures targeting such persons are particularly intrusive and it is especially
likely that such measures will adversely affect those targeted. In the oral hearing, the
Federal Intelligence Service stated that currently approximately 5% of search terms
target such persons. Insofar as surveillance measures target specific persons in this
manner, the determination of such measures requires ex ante oversight that resembles judicial review. Such oversight must assess whether the targeted surveillance of
specific individuals for achieving the purpose of surveillance satisfies proportionality
requirements.
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cc) For the rest, the possibility of authorising surveillance not based on specific
grounds reaches its limits where, by definition, the use of search terms targeting specific individuals – with comparable certainty – results in the targeted surveillance of
individual telecommunications that is equivalent to surveillance authorised by a targeted warrant. In that case, the legislator must ensure that the requirements regarding such surveillance authorised by a targeted warrant (cf. BVerfGE 141, 220 <268
et seq. para. 103 et seq.; 309 et seq. para. 228 et seq.>) are observed and that they
are not circumvented through strategic surveillance.
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dd) The legislator may only refrain from imposing the abovementioned requirements
and restrictions (see para. 187 et seq. above) if surveillance measures are only
aimed at providing political intelligence to the Federal Government, and if any sharing
of the intelligence with other bodies is ruled out in principle (see para. 177 above).
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f) The authorisation to carry out strategic surveillance must also be restricted by law
insofar as it permits the retention of traffic data in its entirety. The legislator must ensure that the data flows intercepted to this end are substantially limited and that the
data is not stored for more than six months (cf. also BVerfGE 125, 260 <322>).
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g) It is sufficient that the legislator provides for the basic framework governing the
specific steps for the analysis of the intercepted data and tasks the Federal Intelligence Service with creating a detailed structure for analysis in its intelligence service
manual, which must be subject to independent oversight (see para. 272 et seq. be-
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