of Germany and other countries. Effective surveillance requires cooperation between
intelligence services, particularly where surveillance solely aims to provide information to the Federal Government regarding political or military scenarios, but also
where its aim is the early detection of dangers posed by international crime, including
international terrorism. However, the Federal Intelligence Service is only able to engage in such cooperation if it also has the powers to examine the intelligence gathered by other services, to use and further analyse foreign intelligence, and if it can
use its powers to contribute intelligence as a partner. Based on current knowledge,
intelligence services in other countries will commonly have powers to carry out surveillance of foreign telecommunications without specific grounds (in respect of the
United States: Section 702 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; cf. Renan, in: Goldman/Rascoff [eds.], Global Intelligence Oversight, 2016, p. 121 <particularly 123 et
seq.>; in respect of the United Kingdom: part 6 chapter 1 Investigatory Powers Act
2016; cf. Leigh, in: Dietrich/Sule [eds.], Intelligence Law and Policies in Europe, 2019,
p. 553 et seq.; McKay/Walker, in: Dietrich/Gärditz/Graulich/Gusy/Warg [eds.], Reform der Nachrichtendienste zwischen Vergesetzlichung und Internationalisierung,
2019, p. 119 et seq.; in respect of France: Article L854-1 to L854-9 Code de la sécurité intérieure [Des mesures de surveillance des communications électroniques internationales]; cf. also Le Divelec, in: Dietrich/Sule [eds.], Intelligence Law and Policies
in Europe, 2019, p. 516 et seq.; Warusfel, in: Dietrich/Gärditz/Graulich/Gusy/Warg
[eds.], Reform der Nachrichtendienste zwischen Vergesetzlichung und Internationalisierung, 2019, p. 129 et seq.).
(c) The exceptionally significant public interest in the effective gathering of foreign
intelligence must also be taken into account.
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In line with the legislative competence for conferring powers to conduct foreign surveillance (see para. 123 et seq. above), such surveillance is always aimed at yielding
information that is significant for Germany’s position and capacity to act within the international community and, in that sense, is significant to foreign and security policy.
The provision of information to the Federal Government for its decision-making on
foreign and security policy helps it to assert itself in the realm of international power
politics and can prevent erroneous decisions leading to potentially serious consequences. This is indirectly about safeguarding democratic self-determination and protecting the constitutional order – and thus about high-ranking constitutional interests.
What is at issue here is an interest of the nation as a whole, which significantly goes
beyond the interest in guaranteeing national security as such.
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It is important to note that threats originating from abroad have increased significantly as part of the advances in information technology and international communication as well as the closer interconnectedness of living conditions across borders. In
this context, the early detection of dangers originating from abroad takes on particular importance for public security. The expansion and internationalisation of the possibilities for conducting communication and the resulting increased politicisation and
ability to organise of international criminal gangs mean that domestic situations of
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