tionally and for technical reasons; it is meant to be deleted through various filtering
mechanisms after signals processing in a way that does not leave any technical
traces. The interest of the authorities in this data has not taken such specific shape
that the persons concerned must be considered to be directly affected in such a
way that it qualifies as an interference with fundamental rights (cf. BVerfGE 100, 313
<366>; 115, 320 <343>; 150, 244 <266 para. 43>).
However, the current state of technology does not allow for a complete separation
of data concerning German citizens and persons within Germany, meaning that in
some cases such data is included in the analysis. It is then only deleted once the relevant data is identified during manual screening. While it is not clearly ascertainable
that § 6(1) and (4) BNDG permits this approach, such an understanding of the provision is required in order to be able to apply it at all; this is also how it is understood in
practice. This amounts to an interference in relation to persons whose data is intercepted in this manner, without being deleted after signals processing in a way that
does not leave any technical traces, and whose data is thus viewed by Federal Intelligence Service staff. As § 6(1) and (4) BNDG provides the statutory basis for this
approach, it amounts to an authorisation to interfere with the fundamental right under
Art. 10(1) GG in relation to complainant no. 8 as well.
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2. § 6(1) to (3) BNDG gives rise to further interferences with the complainants’ fundamental rights as it authorises further analysis of the data. Firstly, § 6(1) BNDG and,
to the extent set out in that provision, § 14(1) BNDG in conjunction with § 19(1)
BNDG authorise an interference in the form of analysis of the telecommunications
traffic data that was collected, including the data stemming from traffic data retention.
Secondly, § 6(1) to (3) BNDG authorises the analysis of intercepted telecommunications by means of search terms for the purpose of screening content data. The provision also authorises manual screening of the telecommunications identified through
analysis, which encompasses further data processing – ranging from screening
telecommunications selected through search terms to decoding and forwarding them
to the relevant departments for further use – and also amounts to further interferences.
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3. A separate interference with fundamental rights lies in the potential sharing of intelligence obtained through surveillance, to the extent that it contains personal data,
which is provided for under various separate constituent elements in § 24 BNDG. In
the context of intelligence sharing, the data obtained is made accessible to other authorities, which qualifies as a separate interference with fundamental rights with regard to each instance of sharing (cf. BVerfGE 141, 220 <324 and 325 para. 279>).
Accordingly, the automated sharing of information with foreign public bodies, as provided for by § 15(1) BNDG in the context of cooperation, amounts to an interference
with fundamental rights.
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4. § 7 BNDG also gives rise to interferences with Art. 10(1) GG and, where applicable, Art. 5(1) second sentence GG. While this provision itself does not provide for the
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