srecht des Bundes, 2nd ed. 2019, § 1 BNDG para. 56; e.g. in respect of the United
States: Section 702 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; cf. Renan, in: Goldman/
Rascoff [eds.], Global Intelligence Oversight, 2016, p. 121 <123 et seq.>; in respect
of the United Kingdom until 2017: section 8(4) Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act; in respect of the United Kingdom from 2017: part 6 chapter 1 Investigatory Powers Act 2016; cf. Leigh, in: Dietrich/Sule [eds.], Intelligence Law and Policies in Europe, 2019, p. 553 et seq.; McKay/Walker, in: Dietrich/Gärditz/Graulich/Gusy/Warg
[eds.], Reform der Nachrichtendienste zwischen Vergesetzlichung und Internationalisierung, 2019, p. 119 et seq.; in respect of France: Article L854-1 to L854-9 Code
de la sécurité intérieure [Des mesures de surveillance des communications électroniques internationales]; cf. Le Divelec, in: Dietrich/Sule [eds.], Intelligence Law and
Policies in Europe, 2019, 516 et seq.; Warusfel, in: Dietrich/Gärditz/Graulich/Gusy/
Warg [eds.], Reform der Nachrichtendienste zwischen Vergesetzlichung und Internationalisierung, 2019, p. 129 et seq.).
3. The comprehensive binding effect of fundamental rights on German state authority does not alter the fact that the specific protection afforded by fundamental rights
can differ according to the circumstances under which they are applied. Just as this
is the case for the different dimensions of fundamental rights within Germany, it is
also the case for their scope of protection in other countries. The extent to which certain guarantees are applicable differs between Germany and other countries already
with regard to the persons and subject matters afforded protection (see para. 196 below). Likewise, distinctions can be drawn between the different dimensions of fundamental rights – such as the effect fundamental rights have as rights against state interference, as positive obligations of the state, as decisions on values enshrined in
the Constitution, or as the basis for duties of protection. Insofar as fundamental rights
require further determination, the legislator may have to take into account the special
circumstances abroad (cf. BVerfGE 92, 26 <41 et seq.>; cf. also BVerfGE 100, 313
<363>). This applies even more where the state acts in a foreign environment: this
foreign environment must be taken into account when setting requirements for the
justification of interferences with fundamental rights – most notably in the context of
proportionality.
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4. In the present case, the complainants assert a violation of Art. 10(1) and Art. 5(1)
second sentence GG, which, as rights against state interference, afford protection
against surveillance measures carried out in the context of surveillance of foreign
telecommunications. It follows from the fact that German state authority is in principle
comprehensively bound by fundamental rights that the Federal Intelligence Service
and the legislator setting out its powers are also bound by fundamental rights, at least
to the extent set out above. Exempting surveillance measures by intelligence services
from this binding effect of fundamental rights simply because they are directed at foreigners in other countries is alien to the Basic Law, just as exempting them from fundamental rights protection because of their political nature would be. Rather, the
comprehensive binding effect of fundamental rights pursuant to Art. 1(3) GG creates
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