cations process are identified as relevant during the computer-based cross-checking
against predetermined search terms (selectors). According to the submissions made
by the Federal Government and the requirements laid down in the relevant intelligence service manual (DV SIGINT), before they are actively used (“steering”), the
search terms are checked by a department within the Federal Intelligence Service
(“Quality Assurance SIGINT”) as to their conformity with the Service’s mandate, their
legal permissibility – in particular with regard to proportionality – and their plausibility. Content data collected by the Federal Intelligence Service’s systems that has not
been selected on the basis of search terms is deleted in its entirety from the systems
once it has been cross-checked.
The selectors are divided into content-related and formal search terms, yet the Federal Intelligence Service primarily uses the latter (according to the Federal Governmentthey make up approximately 90% of selectors). These formal search terms are
communication parameters, such as telecommunications identifiers or email addresses that can be attributed to persons, entities, groups or phenomena the Federal
Intelligence Service considers relevant. The Federal Intelligence Service can use
such search terms to identify all telecommunications that are sent to the identifier or
address that is used as a search term, are sent from it or contain it and separate
these telecommunications from the rest of the intercepted data for storage. According
to the Federal Government, approximately 5% of search terms serve to obtain targeted information on individuals in view of measures to be taken against them; in all other cases, the persons behind the steered search terms are only sometimes known,
and they themselves and their conduct are not the focus of intelligence gathering.
[…]
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e) Following the selection and storage of content data by means of search terms,
the data is subject to further analysis. This step primarily involves manually screening
data as to its relevance for the Federal Intelligence Service. Currently, an average of
260 data transmissions are identified and forwarded to the relevant departments
every day. According to the Federal Government, it is in this context that the protection of the core of private life required by § 11 BNDG is implemented in practice –
along with an assessment of the relevance of the data and manual screening to
check whether international or domestic telecommunications were intercepted inadvertently. The Federal Government submits that the requirements regarding the protection of the core of private life do not have any practical effect on the previous steps.
According to the relevant intelligence service manual (DV SIGINT) and submissions
of the Federal Government, protected communications of persons entitled to refuse
to give evidence under § 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung
– StPO) are taken into account during manual screening; such communications may
only be used if their particularly significant informative value is balanced against conflicting confidentiality interests and outweighs them.
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f) §§ 13 to 15 BNDG enshrine the practice of the cooperation between intelligence
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