2011 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
11 CONCLUSION
The use of lawful interception and communications data affords significant advantages to law
enforcement bodies, intelligence agencies and other public authorities when investigating the
variety of threats faced by the UK. However, due to the potential intrusion into an individual’s
private life that interception and the acquisition of communications data may involve, it remains
crucial to have effective oversight.
During a period of proposed reform to intelligence oversight, a number of key principles that
define the use and oversight of interception techniques and communications data in the UK
should be preserved.
First, the process by which oversight is conducted should be as transparent as possible. So in this
year’s report I have disclosed further details of how I, and my inspectors on my behalf, conduct
our inspection visits, whom we meet and the matters discussed. I have also disclosed the total
number of interception warrants signed by Secretaries of State and Scottish Ministers. This fulfils
the objective of enabling readers to discern the total pool of warrants from which I select my
samples for review during inspection visits without revealing information that may be detrimental
to national security. When issues of compliance arise these have also been set out in this report.
There are, however, items the disclosure of which in my public report may be detrimental to
national security. Any reasonable member of the public would agree that names of targets and
intelligence techniques cannot be disclosed because disclosure could harm national security.
I can, however, disclose some matters to senior intelligence officials and Ministers engaged in
interception. So this year I have, with the agreement of the Prime Minister and those whom I
oversee, produced a confidential supplement to my open report containing further details of
those policy and legal matters on which I have been consulted by the public authorities I oversee.
It is my intention to distribute this supplement to a select group of senior intelligence officials
and Ministers so they can have a better understanding of what is being overseen, how it is being
overseen, and the impact of such oversight.
Second, I have observed that, as has always been the case, the greatest scrutiny occurs within
public authorities themselves. For example, in relation to lawful interception, an authorisation
must cross the desks of a number of officials, sometimes including legal advisers, and it will be
scrutinised with care several times before it reaches the Secretary of State or Scottish Minister.
Similar safeguards exist in relation to the acquisition of communications data; a request must
be vetted and quality assured by an accredited SPoC before being considered by a Designated
Person of an appropriate rank who sits outside the investigation for which the communications
data is being requested. I have observed that ministers, officials, law enforcement officers and
members of CSPs undertake this internal scrutiny with dedication and integrity.
Third, it should be recognised that my assessment of compliance at those departments and
agencies I oversee is based on a number of sources. It is informed not only by the inspection
of interception warrants, but also interaction with a cross-section of officials and Secretaries
of State or Scottish Ministers involved in lawful interception throughout the year, in addition to
feedback from my inspectors in relation to their communications data and prison inspections
and the reporting of errors.
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