2011 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
emerging capabilities with me outside the inspection visits.
Once again, it is my belief, based on my scrutiny of GCHQ authorisations, in addition to what I
have seen at both Inspection visits and wider briefings, that GCHQ staff conduct themselves with
the highest levels of integrity and legal compliance.
Case Study 4 – Example of an Intercept Error by GCHQ
January 2011 - GCHQ holds a long-running interception warrant against a target
organisation. In 2009, an analyst from the relevant team entered a communications address
onto a targeting database. The address had not, however, been listed on the schedule to
the relevant interception warrant. The anomaly was detected when a manager undertook
a regular house-keeping check on all communications addresses covered by the warrant.
The number was immediately de-tasked and an investigation initiated into any wider
discrepancies between targeting records and authorised communications addresses on
warrants. No intelligence reports were issued based on material incorrectly intercepted.
6.5.2. Security Service (SyS)
Key periods related to my inspection visits to SyS over 2011 were as follows
Selection:
June and November 2011
Inspection Days:
July and December 2011
During my formal Inspection visits to SyS, I was briefed on the following.
• International Counter-terrorism threats
• State-led threats
• Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT)
• Presentations related to specific interception warrants
• Olympics planning
Below are two case studies of instances where the SyS erred.
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