LEANDER v. SWEDEN JUGDMENT
27
whereby, subject to the inherent limitations of the context, the individual
can secure compliance with the relevant laws (see the above-mentioned
James and Others judgment, Series A no. 98, p. 48, § 86).
80.
The Government argued that Swedish law offered sufficient
remedies for the purposes of Article 13 (art. 13), namely
(i) a formal application for the post, and, if unsuccessful, an appeal to
the Government;
(ii) a request to the National Police Board for access to the secret policeregister on the basis of the Freedom of the Press Act, and, if refused, an
appeal to the administrative courts;
(iii) a complaint to the Chancellor of Justice;
(iv) a complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsman.
The majority of the Commission found that these four remedies, taken in
the aggregate, met the requirements of Article 13 (art. 13), although none of
them did so taken alone.
81. The Court notes first that both the Chancellor of Justice and the
Parliamentary Ombudsman have the competence to receive individual
complaints and that they have the duty to investigate such complaints in
order to ensure that the relevant laws have been properly applied by the
National Police Board (see paragraphs 36 and 38 above). In the performance
of these duties, both officials have access to all the information contained in
the secret police-register (see paragraph 41 above). Several decisions from
the Parliamentary Ombudsman evidence that these powers are also used in
relation to complaints regarding the operation of the personnel control
system (see paragraph 39 above). Furthermore, both officials must, in the
present context, be considered independent of the Government. This is quite
clear in respect of the Parliamentary Ombudsman. As far as the Chancellor
of Justice is concerned, he may likewise be regarded as being, at least in
practice, independent of the Government when performing his supervisory
functions in relation to the working of the personnel control system (see
paragraph 37 above).
82. The main weakness in the control afforded by the Ombudsman and
the Chancellor of Justice is that both officials, apart from their competence
to institute criminal and disciplinary proceedings (see paragraphs 36-38
above), lack the power to render a legally binding decision. On this point,
the Court, however, recalls the necessarily limited effectiveness that can be
required of any remedy available to the individual concerned in a system of
secret security checks. The opinions of the Parliamentary Ombudsman and
the Chancellor of Justice command by tradition great respect in Swedish
society and in practice are usually followed (see paragraphs 37-38 above). It
is also material - although this does not constitute a remedy that the
individual can exercise of his own accord - that a special feature of the
Swedish personnel control system is the substantial parliamentary
supervision to which it is subject, in particular through the parliamentarians