Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner - 2016
than because those numbers genuinely should not have been intercepted.
If a request to intercept a prisoner’s communications is made on the grounds of public safety
or to maintain prison security, there needs to be an Interception Risk Assessment. This should
explain the threat, provide a proposed course of action, and justify the proportionality. However,
my inspectors frequently found that that these necessity and proportionality justifications
were not detailed or strong enough to enable the prison to demonstrate how a Governor had
made an informed decision whether to intercept that prisoner’s communications. This was
particularly frequent in assessments, authorisations and reviews of prisoners who pose a risk
to the public, such as those convicted of a sexual offence.
Since the introduction of the new Instruction in July 2016, 38% of establishments have
failed to complete the application process to a suitable standard. Inspectors highlighted:
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incorrect documentation;
a general lack of detail;
lack of Human Rights justifications;
no considerations by an authorising officer and
poor reviews
In addressing this key area of the process, I endorse the comments made by my predecessor
Sir Swinton Thomas during his first inspection of HMP Belmarsh in November 2002:
‘I consider that there is an urgent need for all those engaged in this work to be provided
with a written document detailing the safeguards that must be followed in relation to the
interception of prisoners’ communications of a type which is familiar to those engaged
in interception work in law enforcement and intelligence fields. There is also a need
for those engaged in this work to be trained as to their obligations. This appears to
be notably absent at the present time. I am confident that this is not a problem that is
peculiar to this prison and needs to be addressed by the Prison Service.’
In 44% of cases, prisons were not listening to all relevant intercepted calls in a timely
manner. This is a concern. Either prisons are taking a risk by failing to conduct interceptions
they have identified as necessary for safety reasons, or the original cases were incorrect
and the prisoners in question should not have been intercepted at all.
To improve standards in interception and to ensure that risks are managed correctly,
the 2016 instruction recommended a Daily Management log. This electronic document
was designed to summarise the intelligence gathered on a daily basis on each prisoner
subject interception. It should act as an overarching management tool to support staff
and raise the profile of interception. However, use of the Daily Management Log required
a computer to be located next to the pin-phone monitoring terminal. Many prisons had
not installed a new computer, and so, between July and December 2016, only 22% met
this new requirement.
Another amendment required the physical recording of all forms of interception to be
completed electronically. In similar circumstances to the Daily Management Log, only 22% of
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