processing the interception product detected these errors promptly and the interception
was immediately suspended and then cancelled. It is important that agencies report such
instances to IOCCO. Even though the interception of the communications address was
authorised by the Secretary of State, the conduct resulted in intrusion into the privacy
of individuals who were not of intelligence interest and for whom the Secretary of State
did not consider the necessity or proportionality of such measures. As a result, I do not
consider the interception to have been properly authorised. The agencies must take
steps to reinforce within operational teams the importance of identifying promptly when
a subject of interest is not using a particular communications address, ensuring that the
interception is suspended and cancelled immediately.
The interception agencies, warrant-granting departments and CSPs provided IOCCO with
full reports of the errors. I am content that the measures put in place to prevent recurrence
were sufficiently robust, and any erroneously acquired material or data that was not of
intelligence interest was destroyed.
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