4.8 Forty one of the prisons emerged well from the inspections and the overall
level of compliance with the rules was good or very good. Indeed the Inspectors
found examples of good practice which are now firmly embedded in the systems
and processes and managers and staff clearly demonstrated a commitment to
achieve the best possible standards. The prisons which have a dedicated team of
well trained staff to conduct the interception of communications always achieve
much better standards and we always advocate this as best practice.
4.9 Regrettably very serious weaknesses and failings were found in the systems
and processes of 24 of the prison establishments which were inspected. The other
19 establishments fared a little better but nevertheless failings and weaknesses
were also found during their inspections. This number is too high and it indicates
a failure by managers and staff to ensure that the interception of communications
is conducted fully in accordance with the rules. Failure to do so could potentially
place children, vulnerable prisoners, members of the public and prison staff in
harm’s way and managers have been warned that they could then find themselves
in an indefensible position. Having said that I do not imply that prison managers
and their staff are deliberately setting out to circumvent the rules. Often these
failings result from a lack of equipment and resources to conduct the interception
efficiently and effectively, especially when large numbers of prisoners need to be
monitored because they are considered a risk to children or are subject to harassment
restrictions. However, these failings often occur because the monitoring staff lack
clear leadership, direction and supervision and this can easily be remedied.
4.10 In quite a number of establishments the monitoring of prisoners who pose a
risk to children or the public is still a weak area. For example, in one establishment
in the High Security Estate the Offender Management Unit (OMU) had decided that
the telephone calls and correspondence of 476 prisoners needed to be monitored.
This target was completely unrealistic and unattainable and a huge increase in
staff and equipment would be necessary to ensure the monitoring was conducted
efficiently and effectively. The Prison Service simply does not have the funding
to pay for this, and I am not convinced that it would be money well spent. The
setting of targets must be geared to the level of risk which the prisoners pose, and
the equipment and resources that are available, otherwise the monitoring staff will
not be able to prioritise their work. In my judgement each establishment must try
to adopt the most tenable position it can, given that there may be a large number
of individuals who pose a risk to children or are subject to harassment restrictions.
In some instances this may not always be the best position, but good evidence
should be created to show that the risk factors have been taken into account, as far
as possible, and that is all that can be achieved in the prevailing circumstances.
4.11 Fortunately my Inspectors have not found any evidence of harm to children
or members of the public who need to be protected from these prisoners, but the
whole process could be managed much better. At the beginning of the year a new
version of the National Security Framework (NSF) was issued and it now stipulates
that Interception Risk Assessments must be introduced into the process. Various
factors now have to be taken into account in the Interception Risk Assessment
before an authorisation is granted to monitor a prisoner’s communications. The
introduction of the Interception Risk Assessments creates good evidence to
support the Authorising Officer’s decision whether monitoring is necessary or
not. If an authorisation is produced to conduct offence related monitoring then
the Authorising Officer must have a clear expectation that the communications
will be properly evaluated. I am pleased to say the introduction of the Interception
Risk Assessments is already having a marked effect and they are enabling the
Offender Management Units to reduce the number of prisoners who actually need
to be monitored. The monitoring staff are then able to focus their efforts upon
the prisoners who pose the highest risk. Individuals can be moved back onto the
monitoring list at any time if fresh intelligence indicates that they pose an increased
risk to children or the public, or immediately before their release, or transfer to
another establishment, to establish their mindset. The information gathered from
19