for the third time and the others have had two inspections since the legislation was
introduced.
3.49 By comparison with police forces and law enforcement agencies the above
mentioned public authorities make very limited use of their powers to acquire
communications data. For example, the public authorities, which are named in
the preceding paragraph, made a total of 2,259 requests for communications data.
The largest user by far was the Financial Services Authority with 1,705 requests
for data. Eleven errors were reported by the above mentioned public authorities
during the same period. One of these errors was found during the inspection of
Defra as a log on history had been obtained for an Internet Protocol Address. This
constitutes traffic data and Defra is not allowed to acquire this type of data under
the Act. Defra only made three applications for communications data during the
course of the year and the accredited staff had genuinely not realised that they had
made a request which was unlawful. Action has been taken to prevent this type of
error occurring in the future.
3.50 With the exception of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS)
all of the public authorities emerged well from the inspections and the Inspectors
were generally satisfied that communications data was being acquired lawfully
and for a correct statutory purpose. I should clarify that the National Offender
Management Service was not acting unlawfully but its systems and processes
needed to be maintained to a much better standard and a series of recommendations
were made to help them do so. The Director of NOMS has since informed us that
the recommendations have been implemented.
3.51 Generally the inspections confirmed that the above mentioned public
authorities acquire communications data for specialist purposes and they use
their powers responsibly. For example, the Royal Mail had made good use of
communications data to investigate Parcel Force employees who were stealing
items from the postal system. The Environment Agency had used communications
data to investigate unlicensed landfill sites and related offences under Section
33 of the Environmental Protection Act. The MHRA mainly acquired subscriber
information to identify persons who were involved in the supply and distribution
of unlicensed, unlawful or counterfeit medicines and medical devices which could
cause harm or loss of life.
Section 4: Interception in Prisons
General
4.1 At the request of the Secretary of State I have continued to provide oversight
of the interception of communications in prisons in England & Wales. This is a
non-statutory role and in practice most of the inspections are conducted by my
Inspectors although I have sight of every report which they produce. Last year my
non-statutory oversight responsibilities were extended to cover the three prisons
which operate in Northern Ireland. Only one of the prisons in Northern Ireland
was inspected and it was sustaining a good level of compliance.
4.2 The interception of prisoners’ telephone calls and correspondence is
permitted, and in some cases is mandatory, under the Prison Act 1952 and the
National Security Framework (NSF). The NSF stipulates that any telephone call
may be listened to or letter read if intelligence suggests that this is necessary and
proportionate under Prison Rule 35A or YOIR 11(4). Interception is mandatory,
usually in the case of High Risk Category A prisoners and prisoners who have been
placed on the Escape List. Often it is necessary to monitor the communications
of prisoners who have been convicted of sexual or harassment offences, and who
continue to pose a significant risk to children or the public. Communications which
are subject to legal privilege are protected and there are also special arrangements
in place for dealing with confidential matters, such as contact with the Samaritans
and a prisoner’s constituency MP.
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