and Hong Kong, the laws and basic principles that govern such practices are the
same. The discussion I had with the officers provided an interesting insight into
differences in procedures and practices.
Successes
2.14 It is impressive to see how interception has contributed to a number of striking
law enforcement and national security successes during 2009. It has played a key
role in numerous operations including, for example, the prevention of murders,
tackling large-scale drug importations, evasion of Excise duty, people smuggling,
gathering intelligence both within the United Kingdom and overseas on terrorist
and various extremist organisations, confiscation of firearms, serious violent crime
and terrorism. I have provided fully detailed examples in the Confidential Annex
to this Report. I think it is very important that the public is re-assured as to the
benefits of this highly intrusive investigative tool, particularly in light of the ongoing debate about whether or not intercept product should be used as evidence in
a court of law.
Errors
2.15 Thirty six errors and breaches have been reported to me during the course
of 2009. This is a 28% decrease from the total of 50 errors and breaches reported
in my last Annual Report. By way of example, details of some of these errors are
recorded below. It is important from the point of view of the public that I stress
that none of the breaches or errors was deliberate, that all were caused by human
error, or procedural error, or by technical problems and that in every case either
no interception took place or, if there was interception, the product was destroyed
immediately on discovery of the error. Where breaches or errors occur, procedures
are subsequently revised or strengthened in order to minimise the chances of a
similar mistake being made again. The most common cause of error tends to be
the simple transposition of numbers by mistake e.g., 1969 instead of 1996. The
examples that I give are typical of the whole and are anonymous so far as the
targets are concerned. Full details of all the errors and breaches are set out in the
Confidential Annex.
2.16 Eleven errors were reported to me by GCHQ. By way of example, three
of these errors, which were similar in nature, resulted from the failure on the
part of the relevant reporting areas to ensure that decisions to remove targets
from the appropriate warrantry certificate were followed up with the appropriate
actions to de-activate the targeting. All items collected as a result of these failures
were deleted from GCHQ’s systems, and the relevant staff were reminded of the
importance of the formal procedures for removing targets from or adding targets
to a certificate. Extra checks have also been incorporated into the processes to
prevent future recurrences.
2.17 The Security Service reported ten errors that were directly attributable to
them. Brief details of three of these are given below.
2.18 In the first case material that was subject to journalistic privilege was not
handled in accordance with the agreed procedures. This material has now been
reviewed according to the established procedures and, where appropriate, has been
labelled with additional caveats concerning further dissemination. The relevant
investigator has been reminded of the importance of informing transcribers
when targets are or may be involved in exchanges that may produce confidential
material.
2.19 The second error involved a warrant where an incorrect digit was used
when the warrant was applied for resulting in an incorrect telephone number
being intercepted. The interception was immediately cancelled and all product
destroyed.
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