try to adopt the most tenable position it can, given that there may be a large number
of individuals who are subject to safeguarding children procedures or harassment
restrictions. In some instances this may not always be the best position but good
evidence should be created to show that the risk factors have been taken into
account, as far as possible, and that it is all that can be achieved in the prevailing
circumstances.
4.10 Quite often these failings occur because a good joined up approach does
not exist between staff in Security and the Offender Management Unit (OMU).
Generally the staff in the OMU will have responsibility for identifying and risk
assessing prisoners who they perceive to be in need of monitoring, and authorisations
will be obtained for this purpose. The Security staff are then expected to monitor
all the communications of these prisoners even though the targets which they have
been set are neither realistic nor attainable. Fortunately my Inspectors have not
found any evidence of harm to children or members of the public who need to be
protected from these prisoners. It may be the risk assessment process is not being
applied as robustly as it could be. Nevertheless there are a number of extreme
cases where the Inspectors found a complete breakdown in the procedures for
monitoring prisoners for public protection purposes and this must be a cause for
concern.
4.11 The inspections have also revealed that certain prisons do not have the
capacity to monitor prisoners who pose a real threat to their good order and
security and this is a cause for concern. The smuggling of drugs and illicit mobile
telephones are serious problems for most prisons, irrespective of their security
status, and if a serious incident were to occur, which could have been prevented
through the gathering of intercept intelligence, then prison managers and staff
could find themselves in an indefensible position. Regrettably my Inspectors have
had to emphasise this point in a number of their reports. For example, in one large
Category B local prison which holds approximately 1400 prisoners, no prisoners
were subject to targeted monitoring although over 110 illicit mobile telephones
had been seized in the establishment during a period of about 12 months.
4.12 Over a year ago my Chief Inspector and I met the Director General of the
Prison Service to review the outcomes from the various inspections and this
was very useful. The Inspectorate has an excellent working relationship with
the National Intelligence Unit and a new strategy for intercepting prisoners’
communications was developed in response to the findings of the inspections.
In my previous report I mentioned that the Prison Service intended to trial the
new strategy in a number of prisons but progress has been slow. I understand that
the pilot exercise has now been authorised and that it should commence in the
near future. Hopefully the results will be available for the Secretary of State and
Director General to consider later this year.
4.13 Despite the difficulties which are being experienced in some of the prisons
I am encouraged by the fact that more and more of the Governors are ensuring
that the recommendations from the inspections are implemented. The work which
the Governors and their staff have put in to improve the systems and processes is
commendable and much appreciated by me and the Inspectors. It is also rewarding
when one hears that the intelligence yield has increased, and that this has made the
establishment a much safer place for prisoners and members of staff.
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