2.26 The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) reported four errors. I shall give one
example. The deletion of a telephone number from a warrant was authorised by a
senior official in the Foreign Office. This authorisation was communicated to SIS
on the following day. This was the first notification that they had received of the
deletion. SIS took immediate steps to suspend collection of the telephone number,
and the CSP was asked to cease the interception. The error meant that interception
cover was available to SIS for a short period (no more than 36 hours) without any
necessary authority in place. Fortunately, there was no traffic on the line either
before its deletion from the warrant or in the short period after deletion and prior
to suspension and cancellation.
2.27 The Scottish Government reported an error in respect of an interception
warrant obtained for a police force that has had a number of renewals and
modifications made to it. The most recent was an application to add a new number
to the warrant. However, eight days after the modification was signed it transpired
that one of the digits in the telephone number was wrong: an “8” was used instead
of “2”. In terms of collateral intrusion, fortunately, the number submitted in
the modification application had not, according to the communications service
provider, been connected and as such there was neither product obtained nor any
likelihood of interception of an unknown third party. The police force concerned
has revised its internal procedures to ensure no future recurrences.
2.28 The National Technical Assistance Centre (NTAC) reported one error
where a wrong email address had been intercepted. A check on the interception
after it had commenced revealed that a digit in the email address had been omitted.
NTAC took immediate steps to suspend the collection and the agency receiving
the product destroyed all material received relating to the unauthorised email
address.
2.29 I now turn to give two examples of the nine errors made by the CSPs.
2.30 The first error, reported by a CSP itself, occurred in respect of product
being routed to an agency other than the agency which requested the interception.
Upon investigation it was discovered that this was a technical error within the
CSPs system resulting in the request being allocated a case identifying number
applicable to an agency which had not made the request. That non-requesting
agency securely dealt with the product. The CSP operative concerned has been
spoken to and will ensure full accuracy checks are made with all future case
additions. The system has also been amended.
2.31 The second error, reported by the Security Service, occurred when product
received from an interception indicated that the number being intercepted was
different to that on the warrant and corresponding schedule served on a CSP,
and that the user was not the target. This unauthorised intercept was immediately
stopped and all product from the line deleted. The error was due to a technical
error within the CSP and the relevant staff have been duly briefed.
2.32 No errors were reported by the Home Office, Ministry of Defence or
Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command. The error which was
deliberate (and which is referred to in paragraph 2.15. above) was made by a
police officer. It has no security implications, there was no invasion of privacy and
because it has been reported to the relevant prosecuting authority I say no more
about it in this part of my Report.
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