b.
the exercise and performance, by the persons on whom they are conferred
or imposed, of the powers and duties conferred or imposed by or under
Chapter II of Part I;
c.
the exercise and performance by the Secretary of State in relation to
information obtained under Part I of the powers and duties conferred or
imposed on him by or under Part III; and
d.
the adequacy of the arrangements by virtue of which:
i.
the duty which is imposed on the Secretary of State by section 15, and
ii.
so far as is applicable to information obtained under Part I, the duties
imposed by section 55 are sought to be discharged.
6. Chapter II of Part I came into force on 5 January 2004 (see my report at
paragraphs 20-22).
7. Part III (sections 49 to 56, together with Schedule 2) of RIPA is not yet in
force. Part III provides for the acquisition of the means to access or decrypt
protected electronic data. However, the use of information security and
encryption products by terrorist and criminal suspects is not, I understand, as
widespread as had been expected when RIPA was approved by Parliament in the
year 2000. Equally the Government’s investment in the National Technical
Assistance Centre – a Home Office managed facility to undertake complex data
processing – is enabling law enforcement agencies to understand, as far as
necessary, protected electronic data. I understand the Government is keeping
under review the need to implement Part III of RIPA and that a public
consultation may be held later this year.
8. In accordance with these duties I have continued my practice of making
twice yearly visits to the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service,
Government Communications Headquarters, the National Criminal Intelligence
Service, the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police, Strathclyde Police, the
Police Service for Northern Ireland, HM Customs and Excise, the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Scottish Executive and the Ministry
of Defence. Prior to each visit I obtain a complete list of warrants issued or
renewed since my previous visit. I then select, largely at random although there
have been occasions where I have indicated specific cases that I want to see, a
sample of warrants for close inspection. In the course of my visit I satisfy myself
that the warrants fully meet the requirements of RIPA, that proper procedures
have been followed, and that the relevant safeguards and codes of practice have
been followed. During each visit I review each of the files and the supporting
documents and on some occasions discuss the cases directly with the operational
officers concerned. I can view the product of interception. It is important to
ensure that the facts justify the use of interception in each case and that those
concerned with interception fully understand the safeguards and the codes of
practice.
9. I continue to be impressed by the quality, dedication and enthusiasm of the
personnel carrying out this work on behalf of the government and the people of
the United Kingdom. They show that they have a detailed understanding of the
legislation and strive assiduously to comply with the statutory criteria and, in my
view, there is very little, if any, danger that an application which is defective in
substance will be placed before the Secretary of State. Where errors have
occurred, which I refer to below (and in more detail in the Confidential Annex)
these have been errors of detail or procedure and not of substance. All errors are
reported to me and if there is any product it is immediately destroyed. In
conforming to the statutory duty placed on them, the agencies have made
available to me everything that I have wished to see or hear. They welcome the
oversight of the Commissioner, both from the point of view of seeking his advice,
which they do quite frequently, and as a reassurance to the general public that
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