increase of 6 on the 39 errors reported in 2003. The number of errors is
unacceptably high. By way of example, details of some of these errors and
breaches are recorded below. It is very important from the point of view of the
public that I stress that none of the breaches or errors were deliberate, that all
were caused by human or procedural error or by technical problems and that in
every case either no interception took place or, if there was interception, the
product was destroyed immediately on discovery of the error. The most common
cause of error tends to be the simple transposition of numbers by mistake e.g.,
1809 instead of 1890. The examples that I give are typical of the totality and are
anonymous. Full details of the errors and breaches are set out in the Confidential
Annex.
43. Two incidents occurred in the Home Office which were duly reported. The
first concerned their failure to issue a ratification for a modification made under
the emergency procedures. A period of unauthorised interception ensued until the
administrative error was spotted and a new schedule issued. The second related to
the misplacement within the Home Office of a sensitive letter. An investigation
has been launched to establish the circumstances of this incident.
44. The Scottish Executive reported one error where a warrant contained an
incorrect telephone number: individual digits within the number being transposed
incorrectly. The error was made by the relevant police force and not by the staff
of the Scottish Executive.
45. The Northern Ireland Office reported six errors. In one case a warrant was
properly obtained against the target but product revealed that the telephone
numbers quoted on the warrant were incorrect and that the telephone was not, in
fact, used by the intended target. All product was destroyed.
46. In another case an error occurred when a warrant was obtained quoting the
correct telephone number and the name of the target which intelligence revealed
was the wrong person. The warrant was cancelled and a new one against the
correct target name was obtained.
47. Two further errors were reported where warrants contained incorrect
telephone numbers: individual digits within the numbers being transposed
incorrectly.
48. In two other cases a digit was included in the warranted telephone number
which is normally omitted from the prefix. Unfortunately the technology, having
recognised that the number was one figure longer than acceptable, omitted the
last digit of the number resulting in the interception of unidentified people
unrelated to the targets. The warrants were cancelled and all product destroyed.
49. Eight errors were reported by GCHQ of which four are briefly highlighted
below. The first case concerns the inclusion of a selector in a targeting database
even though no modification had been signed to add the selector to a schedule of
an existing warrant. Following discovery of the error two weeks later the selector
was removed from the database. New procedures have been put in place within
the relevant areas of GCHQ to prevent a recurrence of a similar error.
50. The second error arose out of avoidable human error. Instructions to cease
collection were only issued to three of the four communication service providers
served with schedules under an existing warrant. The relevant GCHQ officer left
a message with the fourth communication service provider but he failed to make
it clear on the check sheet used for these purposes that a reply was still pending.
Twelve days elapsed after the modification of schedules before it became clear
that collection by the fourth provider had not ceased. The relevant staff have been
reminded of their responsibilities in ensuring the correct procedures are followed
in future.
51. The third case also arose out of avoidable human error. A target whose calls
10